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Article 2

Trapped in the Amber
STATE COMMON LAW, EMPLOYEE RIGHTS, AND
FEDERAL ENCLAVES
Chad DeVeaux†
“Have you ever seen bugs trapped in amber? . . . Well, here we
are . . . trapped in the amber of this moment. There is no why.”1

INTRODUCTION
“The common law grows like a tree,”2 periodically
sprouting new branches, shedding dead limbs. Stagnation is
antithetical to this concept. “[T]he continued vitality of the
common law . . . depends upon its ability to reflect
contemporary community values and ethics.”3 As Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr. observed,
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if
the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.4

Led by luminaries like Justice Holmes, Karl Llewellyn,
and Benjamin Cardozo, the twentieth century witnessed
dramatic advances in private-law jurisprudence: the virtual
demise of the centuries-old doctrines of caveat emptor,5
†

Associate Professor of Law, Concordia University School of Law (beginning
fall 2012); Assistant Professor of Law, Western State University College of Law (fall
2009-spring 2012); LL.M, Harvard University 2008; J.D., University of Notre Dame
2001; B.A., Bowling Green State University 1997. I extend my deepest thanks to
Patricia O’Connor and Scott Frey of WSU’s law library for their assistance researching
this article and to the editors and staff of the Brooklyn Law Review for their hard work
preparing it for publication. Any mistakes are my responsibility alone.
1
KURT VONNEGUT, SLAUGHTERHOUSE-FIVE 76-77 (1969) (emphasis omitted).
2
Professor Lewis Sargentich invoked this metaphor during his
Jurisprudence class at Harvard Law School in 2007.
3
Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(quoting Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Mgmt. Co., 282 F.2d 943, 946 (1960)).
4
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
469 (1897).
5
Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577,
580-82 (1988).
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contributory negligence,6 and the tort of alienation of
affections;7 the recognition of an implied warranty of
habitability for residential dwellings;8 and the legislative
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).9
Yet in 2012, more than a million Americans10—probably
several million11—live and work in places governed by longdiscarded nineteenth-century precepts, jurisprudential purgatories
where the revenants of long-dead legal doctrines stalk the living.
We call these places federal enclaves—military bases,
federal office buildings and residential complexes, post offices,
and national parks.12 Their existence stems from the
Constitution’s so-called “Enclave Clause,” Article I, Section 8,
Clause 17. This provision empowers Congress to
exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such
District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of
particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat
of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like
Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the
Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection
of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful
Buildings . . . .13

With the surrounding state’s consent, Congress may
establish a federal enclave for any “legitimate governmental

6

Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress Claims, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 877 (2004).
7
Rachel F. Moran, Law and Emotion, Love and Hate, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 747, 774 (2001).
8
CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN
CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 499 (6th ed. 2007).
9
Robert L. Masterson, Converting Obsolete Musical Media to Current
Formats: A Copyright Infringement Defense Arising from the Right to Repair and
Implied Warranty of Fitness, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 281, 298 (2009) (noting that Article 2 of
the UCC has been adopted by the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and
every state except Louisiana).
10
Adams v. Clinton, No. 1:98CV01665, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22848, at *13
(D.D.C. June 30, 1998).
11
See Lawrence H. Mirel, Restoration Project: Give D.C. the Vote It Once
Had, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1999, at B01 (“Millions of people live in so-called federal
enclaves, those territories that have been purchased by, or ceded to, the federal
government for use as military bases, national parks and other federal facilities.”);
Gary Thompson & Lois G. Williams, If We Can’t Vote for Them, Why Can They Tax
Us?, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2000, at B02 (noting that “the millions of federal enclave
residents enjoy congressional representation—by voting either in their home state or
the state where the enclave is located”).
12
See Charles F. Wilkinson, Cross-Jurisdictional Conflicts: An Analysis of
Legitimate State Interests on Federal and Indian Lands, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
145, 152 (1982) (discussing different types of federal enclaves).
13
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
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purpose.”14 When an enclave is created, “the jurisdiction
theretofore residing in the State passes . . . to the United
States.”15 State regulatory authority over the ceded property
ceases and the federal authority becomes “exclusive.”16 This
“grant of ‘exclusive’ legislative power to Congress . . . by its own
weight, bars state regulation without specific congressional
action.”17 While the land remains legally part of the state in
which it sits18 and enclave citizens retain the right to vote in
state elections,19 from a regulatory standpoint enclaves “are to
[the surrounding state] as the territory of one of her sister
states or a foreign land.”20
Enclave status extinguishes state regulatory authority,
but “[t]he Constitution does not command that every vestige of
the laws of the [state] must vanish.”21 In order to ensure “that
no area will be left without a developed legal system,” state
laws “existing at the time of the [state’s] surrender of
sovereignty”22 continue in force as federal laws indefinitely until
“abrogated” by Congress.23 Such preexisting state laws “lose
their character as law of the state and become laws of the
Union.”24 But postcession changes in state law “are not a part of
the body of laws” because “[c]ongressional action is necessary to
keep [the enclave’s law] current.”25 The lower federal courts
have uniformly held that this principle also applies to state
common-law rules in effect at the time of cession.26
14

Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 542 n.11 (1976) (citing Collins v.
Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 528-30 (1938)).
15
Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 657 (1930).
16
United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. 363, 370 (1973).
17
Id. (quoting Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263 (1963)).
18
Howard v. Comm’rs of Sinking Fund of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 626 (1953).
19
Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1970).
20
State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. at 378 (internal quotation marks omitted).
21
James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 99 (1940).
22
Id. at 99.
23
Id. at 99-100.
24
Bd. of Supervisors v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 563-64 (E.D. Va.
1976) (quoting Stokes v. Adair, 265 F.2d 662, 665 (4th Cir. 1959)); accord Sadrakula,
309 U.S. at 100.
25
Sadrakula, 309 U.S. at 99.
26
E.g., Cooper v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 170 F. App’x 496, 497-98 (9th Cir. 2006)
(holding that common law action for wrongful termination of whistleblower and
common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress not cognizable on federal
enclave established before state supreme court recognized cause of action); Stuckstede
v. NJVC LLC, No. 4:09CV0663 JCH, 2010 WL 234953, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 15, 2010)
(holding that common law action for wrongful termination of whistleblower not
cognizable on federal enclave established before state supreme court recognized cause
of action); Bussey v. Edison Int’l, Inc., No. CV 08-0158 AHM (RCx), 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14057, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2009) (same); McMullen v. S. Cal. Edison,
No. EDCV 08-957-VAP (PJWx), 2008 WL 4948664, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2008)
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To date, Congress has created more than five thousand
federal enclaves.27 Collectively, these enclaves encompass
“[r]oughly thirty percent of land in the United States”—more
than 659 million acres.28 Over forty are larger than
Washington, D.C.29 Congress created the vast majority of these
enclaves between 1840 and 1940.30 Few have been created since
the end of World War II.31 Absent congressional action, state
laws effective at the moment the federal government accepted
jurisdiction over these lands remain in force, frozen in time,
like bugs trapped in amber.
Congress has kept criminal law current by enacting the
Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), which “makes applicable on
federal enclaves . . . criminal laws of the State in which the
enclave is located.”32 Whenever the surrounding state alters its
criminal law, the ACA incorporates the modification by
(same); Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1149 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (holding
that common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress not cognizable on
federal enclave established before state supreme court recognized cause of action);
Sundaram v. Brookhaven Nat’l Labs., 424 F. Supp. 2d 545, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (same);
Celli v. Shoell, 995 F. Supp. 1337, 1344 (D. Utah 1998) (same); Snow v. Bechtel Constr.
Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1514, 1521 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that common law action for
wrongful termination of whistleblower not cognizable on federal enclave established
before state supreme court recognized cause of action); Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft
Div., United Aircraft Corp., 425 F. Supp. 81, 88 (D. Conn. 1977) (finding that precession state common law governing personal-injury torts no longer applied within
federal enclave because Congress enacted statute abrogating application of pre-cession
personal-injury torts and applying modern state common law to enclave-based
personal-injury and wrongful-death actions), overruled on other grounds by Vasina v.
Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1981); Orlovetz v. Day & Zimmerman,
Inc., 848 P.2d 463, 466-67 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that common law action for
wrongful termination of whistleblower not cognizable on federal enclave established
before state supreme court recognized cause of action); Buttery v. Robbins, 14 S.E.2d 544,
548 (Va. 1941) (citing Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439 (1929), for the proposition
that state common law rules in effect at time of cession remain in force on an enclave
until abrogated by Congress); Norfolk & P.B.L.R. Co. v. Parker, 147 S.E. 461, 463 (Va.
1929) (holding that state common law rules in effect at time of cession remain in force on
an enclave until abrogated by Congress), superseded by statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-34
(1950), as recognized in Hudgins v. Jones, 138 S.E.2d 16, 22 (Va. 1964).
27
Adams v. Clinton, No. 1:98CV01665, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22848, at *13
(D.D.C. June 30, 1998).
28
Jonathan Turley, Too Clever by Half: The Unconstitutionality of Partial
Representation of the District of Columbia in Congress, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 305, 362
(2008) (emphasis added).
29
Carl Strass, Federal Enclaves—Through the Looking Glass—Darkly, 15
SYRACUSE L. REV. 754, 755 (1964).
30
Congress amended the United States Code in 1940 to stop the flood of
enclave creation “end[ing] a period of 100 years during which the Federal Government,
with relatively minor exceptions, acquired legislative jurisdiction over substantially all
of its land acquisitions within the States.” Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 152 n.21
(quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION 49-50 (1969)).
31
Id.
32
Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 158 (1998).
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reference into the federalized state law governing the enclave.33
Congress has similarly incorporated contemporary state
wrongful-death,34 personal-injury,35 and workers’ compensation
statutes36 into enclave law. But Congress has otherwise failed
to “keep . . . current”37 the body of private law governing
enclaves.38 With respect to legal areas neglected by Congress,
federal enclaves have devolved into jurisprudential Jurassic
Parks, “sanctuar[ies] for the obsolete restrictions of the
common law.”39
One such arena is labor law. More than a million people
are likely employed on federal enclaves.40 Almost every state
endows employees with greater rights and remedies than
federal law requires.41 Such state-enacted protections include:
33

United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 292 (1958).
16 U.S.C. § 457 (2006).
35
Id.
36
40 U.S.C. § 3172 (2006).
37
James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940).
38
See Stephen E. Castlen & Gregory O. Block, Exclusive Federal Legislative
Jurisdiction: Get Rid of It!, 154 MIL. L. REV. 113, 124 (1997) (“Congress . . . has not
passed legislation for enclaves relative to contracts, sales, agency, probate,
guardianship, family relations, and torts not involving death or personal injury.”).
39
Capetola v. Barclay-White Co., 48 F. Supp. 797, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
40
No official statistics are available concerning the number of individuals
employed on federal enclaves. I base my assertion that the number likely exceeds one
million upon several facts. First, nearly thirty percent of the United States falls within
the boundaries of a federal enclave. Turley, supra note 28, at 362. Second, more than a
million citizens live on enclaves. Adams v. Clinton, No. 1:98CV01665, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22848, at *13 (D.D.C. June 30, 1998). Indeed, several million people likely
reside on federal enclaves. Mirel, supra note 11, at B01; Thompson & Williams, supra
note 11, at B02. Finally, the sheer number of decisions concerning suits by federal
enclave employees suggests that the number of individuals employed in such places is
very large. E.g., Cooper v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 170 F. App’x 496, 497-98 (9th Cir. 2006);
Manning v. Gold Belt Falcon, LLC, 681 F. Supp. 2d 574, 576 (D.N.J. 2010); Klausner v.
Lucas Film Entm’t Co., No. 09-03502 CW, 2010 WL 1038228, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19,
2010); Stuckstede v. NJVC LLC, No. 4:09CV0663 JCH, 2010 WL 234953, at *1 (E.D.
Mo. Jan. 15, 2010); Rosseter v. Indus. Light & Magic, No. C 08-04545 WHA, 2009 WL
210452, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2009); McMullen v. S. Cal. Edison, No. EDCV 08-957VAP (PJWx), 2008 WL 4948664, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2008); Mersnick v.
USProtect Corp., No. C-06-03993 RMW, 2007 WL 2669816, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7,
2007); Janulewicz v. Bechtel Corp., No. 06-CV-1413-H (WMC), 2007 WL 2462110, at
*3-4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2007); Sundaram v. Brookhaven Nat’l Lab., 424 F. Supp. 2d
545, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Hutchinson v. Andrulis Corp., No. 5:03CV1-MCR/WCS, 2004
WL 691790, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2004); Kelly v. Lockheed Martin Servs. Grp., 25
F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.P.R. 1998); George v. UXB Int’l, Inc., No. C-95-20048-JW, 1996 WL
241624, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 1996); Miller v. Wackenhut Serv., Inc., 808 F. Supp.
697, 699-700 (W.D. Mo. 1992); Snow v. Bechtel Constr. Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1514, 1521
(C.D. Cal. 1986); Lockhart v. MVM, Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 206, 212-13 (Ct. App. 2009);
Orlovetz v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 848 P.2d 463, 466-67 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993); Dep’t
of Labor & Indus. v. Dirt & Aggregate, Inc., 837 P.2d 1018, 1021-22 (Wash. 1992).
41
Peter Romer-Friedman, Eliot Spitzer Meets Mother Jones: How State
Attorneys General Can Enforce State Wage and Hour Laws, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 495, 503 (2006).
34
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• the right to higher minimum wages than those
guaranteed by federal law,42
• the right to receive overtime under circumstances not
required by federal law,43
• the right to receive benefits for dependents and
domestic partners not provided by federal law,44
• greater rights to medical leave to care for ailing family
members than those provided by federal law,45
• protections against discrimination not provided by
federal law,46
• more stringent workplace safety standards than
federal law requires,47 and
• common law causes of action against employers for the
termination of at-will employees for reasons or under
circumstances that violate public policy,48 including the
termination of whistleblowers.49
Because nineteenth- and early twentieth-century precepts
govern most aspects of enclave private law, civilians employed on
federal enclaves typically enjoy none of these rights.50
Modern state private law should not necessarily extend
to government employees or military personnel acting in their
official capacities within an enclave. Such extension of state
law might “frustrate specific [federal] objectives” for the
enclave.51 But no compelling reason exists to deny civilians—and
government and military officials acting in their private
capacities—the application of modern private law. Today,
private corporations unaffiliated with the military derive
millions of dollars in revenue from transactions conducted
within federal enclaves.52 A teenager employed at a fast-food
restaurant within an enclave ought to be entitled to the same
wage-and-hour and workplace-safety laws as an employee who
works just outside the boundaries of the enclave. Under the
current law, he is not. An army servicewoman who purchases a
bicycle for her child from an enclave retailer ought to enjoy the
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

49
50
51
52

See infra note 294 and accompanying text.
See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
See infra note 296 and accompanying text.
See infra note 295 and accompanying text.
See infra note 300 and accompanying text.
See infra note 302 and accompanying text.
See infra note 313 and accompanying text.
See infra note 320 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 303-25 and accompanying text.
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979).
See infra Parts V & VI.
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implied warranties imposed by the UCC. Because most enclaves
predate the adoption of the UCC, such sales are virtually always
governed by the outmoded doctrine of caveat emptor.53
I am personally acquainted with the eccentricities of
federal-enclave law. As a young attorney, I represented a pro
bono client facing eviction from a residential apartment in the
Presidio of San Francisco, a federal enclave administered by
the National Parks Service.54 I removed the case to federal
court on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction because the
law governing his suit was California’s 1872 unlawful-detainer
statute, which lived on as “‘federalized’ state law.”55 The
Presidio is a bustling commercial center in the heart of San
Francisco. Millions of dollars of commercial transactions take
place on the Presidio each year.56 Yet nineteenth-century
private law governs most conduct there. As then-Congressman
James Buchanan observed in 1823, federal enclaves represent
a “palpable defect in our system” because “a great variety of
actions, to which a high degree of moral guilt is attached, and
which are punished . . . at the common law . . . by every
State . . . may be committed with impunity [within enclaves].”57
So it is with the Presidio today.58
The premise that when jurisdiction is transferred from
one government to another existing laws remain in force until
abrogated by the new sovereign is derived from international

53

Most federal enclaves were established between 1840 and 1940. Wilkinson,
supra note 12, at 152 n.21. Most states enacted the Uniform Commercial Code during
the 1960s. See Harry J. Haynsworth, The Unified Business Organizations Code: The
Next Generation, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 83, 101 (2004).
54
See Swords to Plowshares v. Kemp, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
55
Id. at 1037. As “federalized” law, the “assimilated state [unlawful detainer]
law [wa]s distinctly federal in nature,” thus “its application establishe[d] the basis for
federal question jurisdiction.” Id. at 1038. My client resided in federal housing. Id. at 1038
n.7. I removed the case to federal court because I planned to challenge his eviction on dueprocess grounds and I preferred to make this argument before a federal forum. This
strategy proved successful. See Swords to Plowshares v. Kemp, No. C05-01661MJJ, 2005
WL 3882063, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2005). While my client resided in federally
subsidized housing, notably, the majority of housing units on the Presidio are not
subsidized and operate for profit. Dan Levy, A Green Belt in the Black: Presidio as National
Park Achieves Self-Sustaining Goal 8 Years Early, S.F. CHRON., June 19, 2005, at A-1.
56
Levy, supra note 55, at A-1.
57
Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 160 (1998) (quoting 40 ANNALS OF
CONG. 930 (1823)).
58
The state of the law in the Presidio is reminiscent of the phenomenon
astronomers refer to as a singularity—the center of a black hole where the past and
present collide rendering invalid the ordinary laws of physics. Marcus Chown, Dark
Matter Rockets and Black Hole Starships, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 28, 2009, at 34, 36-37.
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law.59 The principle “assures that no area however small will be
left without a developed legal system for private rights.”60 But
these assimilated laws are not meant to live on into perpetuity.
They are intended to serve only as a jurisprudential backstop to
prevent anarchy during the transition period.61 Upon accepting
jurisdiction, the new sovereign assumes the responsibility to
actually govern the territory.62 In common-law countries, the
new sovereign’s courts likewise assume the responsibility to
promulgate common-law rules for the territory.63 I posit that
enclave common law should not remain forever frozen in time at
the moment of cession. While state court common-lawmaking
jurisdiction is extinguished, the responsibility to maintain
enclave private law should pass from the state to the federal
courts and become a matter of federal common law.
Congress and the federal courts share the blame for the
nonsensical state of enclave law. Both have wholly abdicated
their respective responsibilities. Congress has failed to enact
private-law legislation for enclaves. More critically, the federal
courts have refused to assume responsibility for enclave
common-law development.
This article argues that as federal instrumentalities,
enclaves should be subject to federal common law. Moreover,
federal courts should use their discretion to borrow64 the
common law of the surrounding state, so long as doing so does
not “frustrate specific [federal] objectives” for the particular
enclave.65 Because many aspects of state labor law, like wageand-hour provisions, cannot be enacted through the commonlawmaking process, Congress should enact a statute, similar to
the ACA, making state labor laws applicable to civilians
employed within federal enclaves.
59

See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828) (holding that
Spanish private law governed Florida territory until abrogated by Congress).
60
James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940) (citing Chi.,
Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 542 (1885)).
61
See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Donoho, 356 P.2d 267, 271 (Colo. 1960)
(asserting that adoption of preexisting state laws was intended to temporarily “fill the
vacuum which would otherwise exist” in enclave private law).
62
See United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246, 253-54 (1819) (ruling
that acquisition of possession and control of territory endows the sovereign with
exclusive prerogative to govern that territory).
63
See Cornelius J. Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the
Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REV. 265, 265-66 (1963) (arguing that courts
historically assume responsibility for private-law development subject to sporadic
legislative involvement).
64
California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 283
(1982); accord United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-28 (1979).
65
Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728.
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Part I of this article explores the origin and development
of the federal-enclave doctrine from its genesis, as a rule of
international law adopted by the Marshall Court in 1828,66 to the
Court’s most recent reaffirmation of the principle in 1973.67
Part II addresses Congress’s authority to assimilate
contemporary state law, making such law applicable within
federal enclaves. In particular, this part examines federal statutes
making modern state criminal codes, workers’ compensation laws,
and wrongful-death acts applicable in federal enclaves.
Part III discusses limitations upon the authority ceded by
the states to the federal government. This part examines the
right of states to reserve limited legislative authority as a
condition of cession. In addition, this part addresses the
Supreme Court’s somewhat paradoxical assertion that an
enclave is “to [the surrounding state] as the territory of one of
her sister states or a foreign land,”68 yet nonetheless “d[oes] not
cease to be a part of [the surrounding state].”69 This part also
addresses the right of enclave residents to vote in state elections.
Part IV addresses the inapplicability of modern state
choice-of-law rules in litigation arising on federal enclaves.
Today, most states employ interest-balancing tests when
deciding which jurisdiction’s law to apply in litigation involving
contact with multiple states.70 Because the law applicable to
federal enclaves is viewed as federal law—notwithstanding its
origin as state law—the Supremacy Clause bars courts from
balancing the enclave’s interests against those of surrounding
states.71 The Supremacy Clause dictates that the enclave’s
federalized state law must be applied when the pertinent
events giving rise to a suit occur on a federal enclave even if
the surrounding state possesses materially greater interests in
the litigation’s outcome.
Part V explores some of the federal-enclave doctrine’s
perverse effects. Because the doctrine freezes in time existing
state private law—both statutory and common law—long-dead
canons such as the tort of alienation of affections and the
doctrine of caveat emptor live on in most enclaves as

66

See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828).
United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. 363, 378 (1973) (reaffirming
doctrine of exclusive federal jurisdiction over enclaves).
68
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
69
Howard v. Comm’rs of Sinking Fund of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 626 (1953).
70
See infra Part IV.
71
See infra Part IV.
67
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jurisprudential zombies.72 Meanwhile, modern legal innovations
like comparative fault and the UCC are inapplicable because
post-acquisition changes to state law do not apply within
enclaves absent congressional action.73
Part VI addresses the enclave doctrine’s pernicious
impact upon labor law. In the latter half of the twentieth
century, the vast majority of states amended their labor codes
to provide employees greater rights and remedies than those
mandated by federal law.74 Additionally, state courts now offer
employees common-law claims for relief not recognized by
federal law, particularly the tort of wrongful termination in
violation of public policy.75 States did not recognize these rights
and remedies when most federal enclaves were established.
Thus, federal courts routinely dismiss such claims when
brought by civilian workers employed by private corporations
on federal enclaves.76
Finally in Part VII, I offer two solutions to the problems
posed by the federal-enclave doctrine. First, I argue that the
lower federal courts are incorrect in their conclusion that the
federal-enclave doctrine freezes in time state common-law
rules. I assert that as federal instrumentalities, enclaves fall
within the ambit of federal common law. Since no need exists
for enclaves to be governed by “a nationally uniform body of
[common] law,”77 federal courts should, for each enclave, use
their discretion to borrow78 the common law of the surrounding
state.79 Second, I propose that Congress enact an Assimilative
Labor Act—in the spirit of the ACA—affording the rights and
remedies provided by contemporary state labor statutes to
nongovernmental workers employed within federal enclaves.
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See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
74
See infra Part VI.
75
See infra Part VI.
76
See infra Part VI.
77
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979).
78
California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 283
(1982); accord Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 727-28.
79
Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728.
73
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STATE LAWS IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF FEDERAL
ACQUISITION REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL CHANGED BY
CONGRESS

A.

The Ballad of McGlinn’s Cow

509

The genesis of the federal-enclave doctrine lies in the
Supreme Court’s 1885 opinion Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
Railway Co. v. McGlinn.80 The decision addresses the
application of a Kansas statute to the Fort Leavenworth
Military Reservation, a federal enclave.81
On February 22, 1875, Kansas’s legislature passed an
act ceding jurisdiction over Fort Leavenworth to the federal
government.82 The defendant, Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
Railway, operated a railroad that passed through the
reservation.83 In February 1881, a cow owned by the plaintiff,
McGlinn, wandered onto the reservation and was struck by one
of the defendant’s trains.84 McGlinn brought suit under a
Kansas statute enacted in 1874, which rendered railroads
strictly liable for collisions with livestock if the railroad failed
to enclose its tracks “with a good and lawful fence to prevent
the animal from being on the road.”85 The defendant railroad
failed to fence its tracks on the reservation.86 A jury awarded
McGlinn forty-five dollars in damages, twenty-five dollars for
the value of the cow, and twenty dollars in attorneys’ fees.87 The
railroad appealed the verdict, asserting that the Kansas
statute had no application because the reservation was a
federal enclave. The case ultimately found its way to the
Supreme Court’s docket in 1885.
The McGlinn Court concluded that the U.S. government
exercised exclusive dominion over Fort Leavenworth because it
was a federal enclave.88 Thus, upon ceding jurisdiction to the
federal government, Kansas forfeited all regulatory authority
over the reservation.89 But this did not end the inquiry.

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

114 U.S. 542 (1885).
Id. at 543-44.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 543.
Id.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 543-44.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 545-46.
Id.
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The Court applied a rule of international law it had
utilized fifty-seven years earlier in American Insurance Co. v.
Canter.90 Canter recognizes “that whenever political jurisdiction
and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one
nation or sovereign to another, the . . . laws which are intended
for the protection of private rights continue in force until . . . . by
direct action of the new government, they are altered or
repealed.”91 “This assures that no area however small will be left
without a developed legal system for private rights.”92
The Canter Court concluded that property-rights
disputes in the newly acquired Florida Territory were governed
by Spanish laws in effect at the time Spain ceded the
territory.93 The McGlinn Court applied this principle to federal
enclaves and concluded that state private-law statutes in effect
at the time of cession remain in force until altered by
Congress.94 Kansas’s cattle-wounding law predated the federal
government’s acquisition of Fort Leavenworth, and Congress
had taken no action to abrogate the statute.95 Thus, the law
remained in effect on the enclave as federalized state law, and
the trial court properly entered judgment for McGlinn
pursuant to that law.96

90

26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
McGlinn, 114 U.S. at 546-47 (citing Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 542).
92
James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940) (citing
McGlinn, 114 U.S. at 542).
93
Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 544. Of course, Spanish laws in effect at the time of
Florida’s acquisition that conflict with American law—constitutional or statutory—would
terminate when the United States assumed jurisdiction. As the McGlinn Court noted:
91

As a matter of course, all laws . . . in conflict with the political character,
institutions, and constitution of the new government are at once displaced.
Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power—and the
latter is involved in the former—to the United States, the laws of the country
in support of an established religion, or abridging the freedom of the press, or
authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the like, would at once
cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect; and the
laws of the country on other subjects would necessarily be superseded by
existing laws of the new government upon the same matters. But with
respect to other laws affecting the possession, use and transfer of property,
and designed to secure good order and peace in the community, and promote
its health and prosperity, which are strictly of a municipal character, the rule
is general, that a change of government leaves them in force until, by direct
action of the new government, they are altered or repealed.
McGlinn, 114 U.S. at 546-47.
94
McGlinn, 114 U.S. at 547.
95
Id.
96
Id.
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While State Laws in Effect at the Moment of Cession
Live On as Federalized Law, Post-Acquisition Changes
in State Law Have No Effect Within Federal Enclaves

The McGlinn doctrine recognizes that state laws in force
at the time of cession that do not conflict with federal law live
on as federalized state law until abrogated by Congress.97 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this principle in the
years since it decided McGlinn.98
McGlinn, like Canter, embraces the legal fiction that
Congress consciously chose to incorporate the territory’s
existing body of private law into federal law by reference at the
moment of acquisition.99 The doctrine presumes Congress’s
awareness of laws in effect at the moment of cession.100 But
congressional assent cannot be inferred with respect to changes
in the law made after the state cedes regulatory authority to
the federal government.101 “Since only the law in effect at the
time of the transfer of jurisdiction continues in force, future
statutes of the state are not a part of the body of laws in the
ceded area. Congressional action is necessary to keep it
current.”102 Accordingly, the body of private law governing an
enclave in effect at the moment of cession remains in force—
effectively frozen in time—until altered by Congress.

97

Bd. of Supervisors v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 563-64 (E.D. Va.
1976) (citing James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 (1940)); accord Swords to
Plowshares v. Kemp, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1036-37 (N.D. Cal. 2005). As the Supreme
Court later summarized, McGlinn stands for the proposition that:
The Constitution does not command that every vestige of the laws of the
former sovereignty must vanish. On the contrary its language has long been
interpreted so as to permit the continuance until abrogated of those rules
existing at the time of the surrender of sovereignty which govern the rights of
the occupants of the territory transferred. This assures that no area however
small will be left without a developed legal system for private rights.
Sadrakula, 309 U.S. at 99-100 (citing McGlinn, 114 U.S. at 542) (footnote omitted).
98
E.g., United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. 363, 369-70 (1973); Paul
v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 265 (1963); Pac. Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Dep’t of Agric., 318
U.S. 285, 294 (1943); Sadrakula, 309 U.S. at 95; Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S.
647, 657 (1930); McGlinn, 114 U.S. at 542.
99
McGlinn, 114 U.S. at 546-47 (citing Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.)
511, 542 (1828)).
100
See Sadrakula, 309 U.S. at 99-100.
101
See id. at 100.
102
Id.
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Lower Federal Courts Have Uniformly Held that the
McGlinn Doctrine Applies to State Statutory and
Common-Law Rules Alike

Lower federal courts have uniformly concluded that the
McGlinn doctrine dictates that “state common law rules in
effect at the time of cession,” like state statutes, “become the
law of the enclave . . . until displaced by act of Congress.”103
Courts and commentators frequently attribute this assertion to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant.104
In Fant, the Court considered whether to apply an
Arkansas statute to a tort action arising in Hot Springs National
Park.105 Arkansas ceded exclusive jurisdiction over the park to
the federal government in 1904.106 At the time of the transfer,
Arkansas’s common law subjected innkeepers to strict liability
for fire damage to their guests’ personal property.107 In 1913,
Arkansas’s Legislature statutorily repealed the common law
strict-liability rule, limiting inn keepers’ liability to cases of
negligence.108
In 1923, a fire destroyed the Arlington Hotel, which was
located in the park.109 Thereafter, several guests sued the hotel’s
owners in Arkansas state court seeking damages for personal
property lost in the fire.110 Arkansas’s Supreme Court concluded
that the state’s 1913 statute was inapplicable because it postdated cession of the park to the federal government.111 The
103

Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., United Aircraft Corp., 425 F. Supp. 81,
88 (D. Conn. 1977) (finding that pre-cession state common law governing personalinjury torts no longer applied within federal enclave because Congress enacted statute
abrogating application of pre-cession personal-injury torts and applying modern state
common law to enclave-based personal-injury and wrongful-death actions), overruled
on other grounds by Vasina v. Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1981).
104
278 U.S. 439 (1929). Courts and commentators have cited Fant for the
proposition that “state common law rules in effect at the time of cession become the law
of the enclave until displaced by act of Congress.” Quadrini, 425 F. Supp. at 88; accord
Buttery v. Robbins, 14 S.E.2d 544, 548 (Va. 1941) (same); Norfolk & P.B.L.R. Co. v.
Parker, 147 S.E. 461, 464 (Va. 1929) (same), superseded by statute, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-34 (1950), as recognized in Hudgins v. Jones, 138 S.E.2d 16, 22 (Va. 1964);
Michael J. Malinowski, Federal Enclaves and Local Law: Carving Out a Domestic
Violence Exception to Exclusive Legislative Jurisdiction, 100 YALE L.J. 189, 194 (1990)
(citing Fant for the proposition that “[s]tate . . . common law changes made subsequent
to the transfer . . . have no force within the enclave unless authorized by specific
congressional legislation”).
105
Fant, 278 U.S. at 445.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 445-46.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 449.
110
Id. at 445.
111
Id. at 446.
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Arkansas court chose to apply the state’s former common-law
rule, subjecting the innkeeper to strict liability.112 The United
States Supreme Court reviewed the case in 1929.113
The Fant Court reaffirmed that “only the [state] law in
effect at the time of the [enclave’s] transfer of jurisdiction
continues in force” and that “future statutes of the state are not
part of the [enclave’s] body of laws” because “Congressional
action is necessary to keep it current.”114 Courts have since cited
Fant for the proposition that “state common law rules in effect
at the time of cession . . . become the law of the enclave until
displaced by act of Congress.”115 But this constitutes a
fundamental misreading of Fant.
Fant does not contemplate the status of enclave common
law. Rather, the sole question before the Court in Fant
concerned whether a national park could constitute a federal
enclave.116 The innkeeper asserted that “no jurisdiction
was . . . conferred on the United States” because Congress
could not create an enclave for such a purpose.117 The innkeeper
defendant relied on the canon expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, which posits that “one item of [an] associated group or
series excludes another left unmentioned.”118 The defendant
argued that by enumerating the purposes for which Congress
could establish enclaves—“Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dockYards, and other needful Buildings”119—the Constitution
impliedly prohibits the establishment of enclaves for purposes
not enumerated, including national parks.120 Accordingly, the
innkeeper asserted that the Arkansas court erred in refusing to
112

Id. at 445-46.
Id. at 439.
James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940) (citing Fant,
278 U.S. at 445-46).
115
Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., United Aircraft Corp., 425 F. Supp. 81,
88 (D. Conn. 1977) (finding that pre-cession state common law governing personalinjury torts no longer applied within federal enclave because Congress enacted statute
abrogating application of pre-cession personal-injury torts and applying modern state
common law to enclave-based personal-injury and wrongful-death actions), overruled
on other grounds by Vasina v. Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1981);
accord Buttery v. Robbins, 14 S.E.2d 544, 548 (Va. 1941); Norfolk & P.B.L.R. Co. v.
Parker, 147 S.E. 461, 464 (Va. 1929), superseded by statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-34
(1950), as recognized in Hudgins v. Jones, 138 S.E.2d 16, 22 (Va. 1964); Malinowski,
supra note 104, at 194.
116
Fant, 278 U.S. at 449.
117
Id.
118
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80 (2002) (quoting United
States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)).
119
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
120
Fant, 278 U.S. at 449-51.
113
114
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apply the 1913 state statute because the United States never
validly divested Arkansas of jurisdiction over the park.121 The
Fant Court unanimously rejected the contention that
Congress’s authority to establish federal enclaves is limited to
the purposes enumerated in the Enclave Clause.122 The Court
did not address the status of preexisting state common law in a
federal enclave.
Fant predated Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins123 by nine
years. At the time of the Fant decision, the Court still
subscribed to the Swift v. Tyson doctrine.124 Swift dictated “that
federal courts ha[d] the power to use their judgment as to what
the rules of common law are.”125 Thus, Fant does not support
the proposition that federal courts must apply preexisting state
common law rules on federal enclaves because, pursuant to the
Swift doctrine, the Fant Court necessarily regarded Arkansas’s
common law as nonbinding authority regardless of whether the
federal government exercised exclusive jurisdiction over Hot
Springs National Park.126 Prior to Erie, the Supreme Court
viewed common law not as a form of state action, but rather as
“‘a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State
127
but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute.’”
Thus, in the absence of a controlling statute, courts—both state
and federal—possessed “the power to use their judgment as to
128
what the rules of common law are.” The Fant Court did not
grant review regarding the appropriate rule of common law, nor
did the Court venture an opinion on the matter. The Court
merely concluded that “the cession of exclusive jurisdiction” over
the park “was valid” and the Arkansas statute “modifying the
liability of innkeepers, passed after the cession, did not extend
over the ceded land.”129 Accordingly, Fant cannot stand for the

121

Id.
Id. at 454-55. The Court unequivocally reaffirmed this position in Collins v.
Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938), concluding that the United States
validly acquired exclusive jurisdiction over Yosemite National Park. Id. at 530. Thus, it is
now well settled that Congress may establish federal enclaves within States for “any
legitimate governmental purpose.” Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 542 n.11 (1976).
123
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
124
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie, 304 U.S. at 79.
125
Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (explaining the underlying assumption of Swift).
126
See id. at 79-80.
127
Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-36 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
128
Id.
129
Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439, 440 (1929) (syllabus); accord
Standard Oil Co. v. California, 291 U.S. 242, 244 (1934).
122
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proposition that federal courts are bound to apply state common
law rules in effect at the time of an enclave’s cession.
The lower federal courts’ uniform misconstruction of
Fant has wreaked more havoc than any other aspect of federalenclave doctrine. Federal acquisition should not freeze enclave
common law in time. Rather, the power to promulgate common
law for the affected territory must necessarily pass from the
state courts to the federal courts as a matter of federal common
law. While legislatures sometimes intervene to correct
perceived deficiencies, responsibility for the vast majority of
private-law development rests with the courts in their
common-lawmaking function.130
D.

Contrary to the Hopeful Claims of Some Commentators,
the McGlinn Doctrine Remains in Force

The Supreme Court added a wrinkle to the McGlinn
doctrine with its 1963 decision in Paul v. United States.131 Paul
addresses the applicability of regulations promulgated by
California’s Department of Food and Agriculture governing the
price of milk sold on three military bases within the state.132 The
Court found that the three bases each constituted federal
enclaves133 and that the state agency promulgated the price
regulations after California ceded jurisdiction over the bases to the
federal government.134 Based on these facts, the United States
asserted that the McGlinn doctrine dictated that only the agency’s
regulations in effect at the time of cession applied to the sale of
milk on the three enclaves.135 The Court rejected this contention.136
Paul deviates from the previous strict application of the
McGlinn doctrine by allowing state administrative-agency
regulations promulgated after federal acquisition to be applied
within a federal enclave.137 Paul holds that such regulations
apply on the enclave if the “same basic” state-enabling act138
130

Edward A. Tomlinson, Judicial Lawmaking in a Code Jurisdiction: A
French Saga on Certainty of Price in Contract Law, 58 LA. L. REV. 101, 107 (1997).
131
371 U.S. 245 (1963).
132
Id. at 247. The three bases were Travis Air Force Base, Castle Air Force
Base, and the Oakland Army Terminal. Id.
133
Id. at 263-64.
134
Id. at 268-69.
135
Id. at 265.
136
See id.
137
See id.
138
An enabling act is a “statute conferring powers on a[n] [administrative] agenc[y]
to carry out various delegated tasks.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 592 (2d pocket ed. 1996).
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authorizing the agency to promulgate the regulations “ha[s]
been in effect [prior to the] time[s]” of the federal acquisitions
of the property comprising the enclave.139 The Paul Court was
likely motivated by the fact that strict application of the
McGlinn doctrine would lead to a particularly nonsensical
result. The regulations at issue imposed “price controls over
[the sale of] milk.”140 The enabling act tasked California’s
Department of Food and Agriculture to establish minimum
prices sufficient to guarantee milk producers “stability and
prosperity”141 in light of market conditions and rates of
inflation.142 If the price regulations were frozen in time, the
government-mandated milk prices applicable when Paul was
decided in 1963 would have been those in effect when the bases
were established in 1942.143 This would undermine the purpose
of the statute—which was incorporated into federal law upon
the enclaves’ creation—to guarantee producers “stability and
prosperity” as the applicable prices could not be adjusted to
account for present market conditions.144
Some commentators have argued that Paul’s apparent
deviation from the strict rule against the application of postacquisition state law demonstrates a repudiation of McGlinn’s
doctrine of exclusive federal jurisdiction.145 The Court’s
subsequent decision in United States v. State Tax Commission
of Mississippi146—its most recent federal-enclave opinion—
proved this assertion false, reaffirming McGlinn. The Court
held that the Enclave Clause’s “grant of ‘exclusive’ legislative
power to Congress . . . by its own weight, bars state regulation
without specific congressional action,”147 subject only to the
proposition that existing “local law[s] not inconsistent with
federal policy remain[] in force until altered by national
legislation.”148 State laws “adopted . . . after the transfer of
sovereignty” are “without force in [an] enclave.”149

139

Paul, 371 U.S. at 269.
Id.
141
CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 735.1(d) (1937).
142
Challenge Cream & Butter Ass’n v. Parker, 142 P.2d 737, 739 (Cal. 1943).
143
Paul, 371 U.S. at 266.
144
See CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 735.1(d).
145
See, e.g., Richard T. Altieri, Federal Enclaves: The Impact of Exclusive
Legislative Jurisdiction Upon Civil Litigation, 72 MIL. L. REV. 55, 68 (1976).
146
412 U.S. 363 (1973).
147
Id. at 370 (quoting Paul, 371 U.S. at 263).
148
Id. at 369.
149
Id.
140
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Tax Commission demonstrates that Paul does not stand
for the proposition, advanced by some scholars, that a state can
“legislate for [an] enclave, provided that no interference with
federal law . . . is involved.”150 Rather, Paul rests on a fiction
common in administrative-law decisions: “The rulemaking power
granted to an administrative agency charged with the
administration of [an enabling act] is not the power to make law”
but rather “is ‘the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect
the will of [the legislature] as expressed by the statute.’”151 Since
the expression of legislative “will” at issue in Paul predated the
enclaves’ establishment, that “will” was incorporated into and
lived on as federal law. Subsequent administrative regulations
“carry[ing] into effect” that legislative “will” applied on the
enclaves as federal law because the enabling act manifesting it
predated the transfer of sovereignty.152
E.

Subsequent Cessions Expanding Existing Federal
Enclaves Have Created Jurisprudential “Crazy Quilts,”
Where Different Laws Apply in Different Parts of the
Same Enclave

The federal government has compounded the McGlinn
doctrine’s complexity through piecemeal expansion of federal
enclaves over time.153 Because McGlinn incorporates existing
state law into federal law at the moment of cession, the
applicable private law may vary from one parcel of land to
another. These circumstances “require the irrational
application of different law to the various components of a
single” federal enclave.154 The private law applicable within a
particular enclave may literally differ from one side of a street
to the other because the United States acquired jurisdiction
over the respective tracts at different times.
150

Altieri, supra note 145, at 68 (emphasis added).
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976) (quoting Dixon v.
United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965)).
152
See Paul, 371 U.S. at 269.
153
Prof’l Helicopter Pilots Ass’n v. Lear Siegler Servs., 326 F. Supp. 2d 1305,
1311 n.1 (M.D. Ala. 2004), aff’d, 153 F. App’x 630 (11th Cir. 2005); Altieri, supra note 145,
at 88 (“[M]ost enclave areas are composed of tracts of land acquired at different times.”);
Castlen & Block, supra note 38, at 118 (“It is not unusual for property under federal
control, including many military installations, to have been acquired piecemeal over
extended periods of time by a variety of methods. . . . [T]he type of existing legislative
jurisdiction may vary depending on when and how the specific tract was acquired.”).
154
Bd. of Supervisors v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 564 (E.D. Va. 1976);
accord Prof’l Helicopter Pilots Ass’n, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1311 n.1; Castlen & Block,
supra note 38, at 118.
151
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An analogous state of affairs exists in Indian Country.
The federal government exercises, with certain exceptions,
exclusive jurisdiction over land that is owned by Indian tribes
or held in trust by the United States for the benefit of a tribe.155
But when title to tribal land passes to a non-Indian, federal
jurisdiction is terminated and the states exercise primary
jurisdiction.156 The result of this policy is a jurisprudential
“crazy quilt”157 in which “isolated tracts” of property under
exclusive federal jurisdiction “may be scattered checkerboard
fashion over a territory otherwise under state jurisdiction.”158
The McGlinn doctrine creates the same nonsensical “crazy
quilt” within many federal enclaves.159
II.

CONGRESS MAY INCORPORATE THE SURROUNDING
STATE’S CONTEMPORARY LAW BY REFERENCE, MAKING
SUCH LAW APPLICABLE WITHIN ENCLAVES AS
FEDERALIZED STATE LAW

While “[t]he grant of exclusive legislative power to
Congress over enclaves . . . bars state regulation,” state law
may nonetheless apply within an enclave if “Congress consents
to [such] state regulation.”160 Courts generally read
congressional consent to state regulation quite narrowly:
[B]ecause of the fundamental importance of the principles shielding
federal installations and activities from regulation by the states, an
authorization of state regulation is found only when and to the extent
there is a clear congressional mandate, specific congressional action that
makes this authorization of state regulation clear and unambiguous.161

Although consent to state regulation within enclaves
has been rare, Congress has exercised its power to incorporate
contemporary state law to govern a few well-defined subjects.

155

18 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (2006).
DeCoteau v. Dist. Cnty. Court, 420 U.S. 425, 429 n.3 (1975).
157
Id. at 466 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
158
Id. at 429 n.3 (majority opinion).
159
Altieri, supra note 145, at 88 (noting that “most enclave areas are
composed of tracts of land acquired at different times”).
160
Miller v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 697, 700 (W.D. Mo. 1992)
(citing Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263 (1963)).
161
Id. (citing Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976)).
156
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The Assimilative Crimes Act

The First Congress recognized that the absence of state
regulation threatened to render enclaves lawless territories.162
To avert this problem, Congress enacted the Federal Crimes
Act in 1790, “defin[ing] a number of federal crimes” prohibited
within enclave boundaries.163 Because the duty to enact
comprehensive criminal codes typically rests with the states,
Congress’s piecemeal enumeration of offenses proved
insufficient.164 For this reason, in 1825 Congress enacted the
first ACA, which “adopt[ed] for each enclave the offenses made
punishable by the State in which it was situated.”165 The ACA
evidenced a congressional “policy of general conformity to local
[criminal] law.”166 The Act incorporated state criminal law into
the federal law governing federal enclaves.167 The Act did not
delegate any jurisdiction to the states. Instead, it dictated that
violations of the surrounding state’s criminal laws constituted
violations of federal law triable in federal court.168
The 1825 version of the ACA “made no specific reference
to new offenses that might be added by the State after the
enactment of the . . . Act.”169 Thus, enclave criminal law—like
private law assimilated into federal law at the time of
acquisition—became stale over time.
Due to the limitation of the [ACA] of 1825 to state laws in force at
the time of its own enactment, the Act gradually lost much of its
effectiveness in maintaining current conformity with state criminal
laws. This result has been well called one of static conformity. To
renew
such
conformity,
Congress . . . enacted
comparable
Assimilative Crimes Acts in 1866, . . . in 1898, . . . in 1909, . . . in
1933, . . . in 1935, . . . [and] in 1940 . . . .170

Apparently growing weary of the need to constantly renew
the ACA, Congress amended the statute in 1948 to apply to “state
laws . . . enacted” both “before” and “after” the Act so that it “at
once reflects every addition, repeal or amendment of a state
162

United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 288 (1958).
Id.
Id. at 288-89; United States v. Press Publ’g Co., 219 U.S. 1, 12 (1911)
(noting that the Federal Crimes Act was insufficient because “[t]he criminal code of the
United States is singularly defective and inefficient”).
165
Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 289.
166
Id.
167
United States v. Fields, 516 F.3d 923, 931 (10th Cir. 2008).
168
Id.
169
Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 290.
170
Id. at 291.
163
164
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[criminal] law.”171 The 1948 ACA drew the fire of critics
questioning Congress’s authority to incorporate future state penal
statutes prospectively.172 The Supreme Court settled this issue ten
years later with its decision in United States v. Sharpnack.173
The Sharpnack Court upheld the constitutionality of the
ACA. In 1955, the United States indicted Gerald Sharpnack
under the ACA for allegedly committing sex crimes within the
boundaries of Randolph Air Force Base, a federal enclave in
Texas.174 The government predicated its indictment upon alleged
violations of a Texas criminal statute enacted in 1950, two years
after the passage of the modern ACA.175 Sharpnack challenged
the indictment, alleging that “Congress may not legislatively
assimilate and adopt criminal statutes of a state which are
enacted by the state subsequent to the enactment of the [ACA].”176
The Sharpnack Court began its analysis by noting
“[t]here is no doubt that Congress may validly adopt a criminal
code for each federal enclave . . . . by copying laws defining the
criminal offenses in force throughout the State in which the
enclave is situated.”177 From this premise, the Court concluded
that the ACA passed constitutional muster: “Having the power
to assimilate the state laws, Congress obviously has like power
to renew such assimilation annually or daily in order to keep
the laws in the enclaves current with those in the States. That
being so, we conclude that Congress [acted] within its
constitutional powers . . . .”178 Sharpnack regarded the ACA not
as an improper delegation of legislative power to the states, but
as “a deliberate continuing adoption by Congress for federal
enclaves of such unpre-empted offenses and punishments as
shall have been already put in effect by the respective States
for their own government.”179

171

Id. at 292 (emphasis added).
See Note, The Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 70 HARV. L. REV. 685, 68889 (1957) (discussing contemporary arguments that the ACA constituted “an
unconstitutional delegation of Congress’ legislative power” but ultimately arguing that
the statute was constitutional).
173
355 U.S. 286 (1958).
174
Id. at 286.
175
Id. at 286-87.
176
Id. at 287.
177
Id. at 293.
178
Id. at 293-94.
179
Id. at 294.
172
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While the ACA’s critics persist,180 the Supreme Court
never again questioned Congress’s authority to prospectively
incorporate future state criminal statutes into the law
governing federal enclaves. The Court traditionally scrutinizes
federal penal statutes with extra care in light of “the limited
constitutional power of Congress in criminal matters.”181 Thus,
Congress possesses plenary power to enact non-criminal
statutes continually adopting other aspects of state law into the
law of federal enclaves.182
B.

Other Federal Assimilative Acts

Following in the well-laid path of the ACA, Congress
enacted a handful of statutes that continually adopt other
aspects of contemporary state law for application within federal
enclaves. Federal laws now make state workers’ compensation
statutes,183 wrongful-death acts,184 and personal injury laws185
applicable within federal enclaves. In addition, in 1947,
Congress enacted the Buck Act, which authorizes states to
collect income tax from individuals employed on federal
enclaves within their borders.186
While Congress should be lauded for enacting these
statutes, such piecemeal legislation falls far short of adequately
governing the nation’s enclaves. Congress has failed to
implement modern state law in the areas of employment law,187
180

Kristina Daugirdas, International Delegations and Administrative Law, 66
MD. L. REV. 707, 731 (2007); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation
of Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 249 (1997).
181
Bd. of Supervisors v. Stanley, 105 U.S. 305, 313 (1881).
182
Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 294.
183
40 U.S.C. § 3172 (2006).
184
16 U.S.C. § 457 (2006).
185
Id.
186
4 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
187
E.g., Cooper v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 170 F. App’x 496, 497 (9th Cir. 2006)
(holding that common law action for wrongful termination of whistleblower not
cognizable on federal enclave established before state supreme court recognized cause
of action); Manning v. Gold Belt Falcon, LLC, 681 F. Supp. 2d 574, 576 (D.N.J. 2010)
(holding that state wage-and-hour statutes inapplicable on federal enclave); Klausner
v. Lucas Film Entm’t Co., No. 09-03502 CW, 2010 WL 1038228, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
19, 2010) (holding that state employment discrimination statute inapplicable on federal
enclave); Stuckstede v. NJVC LLC, No. 4:09CV0663 JCH, 2010 WL 234953, at *1 (E.D.
Mo. Jan. 15, 2010) (holding that common law action for wrongful termination of
whistleblower not cognizable on federal enclave established before state supreme court
recognized cause of action); Rosseter v. Indus. Light & Magic, No. C 08-04545 WHA,
2009 WL 210452, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2009) (holding that state employment
discrimination statute inapplicable on federal enclave); Bussey v. Edison Int’l, Inc., No.
CV 08-0158 AHM (RCx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14057, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23,
2009) (holding that common law action for wrongful termination of whistleblower not
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housing law,188 consumer protection,189 contracts, agency,
probate, guardianship, family relations, and noninjury torts.190
In these arenas, outmoded nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury state laws prevail in most enclaves.
III.

LIMITATIONS UPON STATE CESSIONS OF JURISDICTION

A.

States May Reserve Limited Legislative Authority over
Federal Enclaves as a Condition of Cession

It is well settled that when a state gives its consent to
federal acquisition of an enclave, it “may qualify its cession by
reservations [of jurisdiction] not inconsistent with the
cognizable on federal enclave established before state supreme court recognized cause
of action); McMullen v. S. Cal. Edison, No. EDCV 08-957-VAP (PJWx), 2008 WL
4948664, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2008) (same); Mersnick v. USProtect Corp., No. C06-03993 RMW, 2007 WL 2669816, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2007) (holding that state
wage-and-hour statutes inapplicable on federal enclave); Janulewicz v. Bechtel Corp.,
No. 06-CV-1413-H (WMC), 2007 WL 2462110, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2007) (holding
that state occupational safety laws and state common law action for wrongful
termination of whistleblower not cognizable on federal enclave); Sundaram v.
Brookhaven Nat’l Lab., 424 F. Supp. 2d 545, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that common
law action for wrongful termination of whistleblower not cognizable on federal enclave
established before state supreme court recognized cause of action); Hutchinson v.
Andrulis Corp., No. 5:03CV1-MCR/WCS, 2004 WL 691790, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 19,
2004) (same); Kelly v. Lockheed Martin Servs. Grp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.P.R. 1998)
(holding that state employment discrimination statute inapplicable on federal enclave);
George v. UXB Int’l, Inc., No. C-95-20048-JW, 1996 WL 241624, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. May
3, 1996) (holding that state wage-and-hour statutes inapplicable on federal enclave);
Miller v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 697, 699-700 (W.D. Mo. 1992) (holding
that state employment discrimination statute inapplicable on federal enclave); Snow v.
Bechtel Constr. Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1514, 1521 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that common
law action for wrongful termination of whistleblower not cognizable on federal enclave
established before state supreme court recognized cause of action); Lockhart v. MVM,
Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 206, 212-13 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding that state employment
discrimination statute inapplicable on federal enclave); Orlovetz v. Day & Zimmerman,
Inc., 848 P.2d 463, 466-67 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that common law action for
wrongful termination of whistleblower not cognizable on federal enclave established
before state supreme court recognized cause of action); Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Dirt
& Aggregate, Inc., 837 P.2d 1018, 1021-22 (Wash. 1992) (holding that state
occupational safety laws inapplicable on federal enclave).
188
Swords to Plowshares v. Kemp, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1037-38 (N.D. Cal.
2005). The states have enacted unlawful-detainer statutes permitting expedited
proceedings to evict individuals from rental housing. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1161 (West 2009). Because these provisions conflict with the federal rules of civil
procedure, they are inapplicable in federal court; thus, removal proceedings, which
take a few months in state court, can be prolonged for years in federal court. S.S.
Silberblatt, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., Nos. 98-16570, 98-16572, 2000 WL 61295, at *2-3
(9th Cir. Jan. 21, 2000); Traverso v. Clear Channel Outdoor Inc., No. C07-03629 MJJ,
2007 WL 3151449, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2007).
189
Mersnick, 2007 WL 2669816, at *4 (holding that California consumer
protection law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200, inapplicable on federal enclave).
190
Castlen & Block, supra note 38, at 124.
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governmental uses.”191 In James v. Dravo Contracting Co.,192 the
Supreme Court considered the permissible scope of such
reservations. In 1931, the United States acquired jurisdiction
over land beneath and adjacent to the Ohio River to construct a
dam.193 In the statute consenting to the federal government’s
acquisition, West Virginia expressly reserved the right to
exercise “concurrent jurisdiction” over the ceded property.194
Later, the State sought to tax a general contractor conducting
business within the cession.195 Dravo upheld West Virginia’s
authority to impose the tax because the State validly reserved
the right to exercise this power as a term of cession.196
Unfortunately, West Virginia’s expansive reservation of
jurisdiction is an anomaly. In most instances, states simply
reserved the right to serve criminal and civil process within ceded
territory.197 These routine reservations of jurisdiction are simply
intended “to prevent [enclaves] from becoming . . . sanctuar[ies]
for fugitives from justice.”198
Additionally, once a state has ceded exclusive
jurisdiction to the United States, it cannot retroactively
reassert authority not claimed in the act of cession.199 In United
States v. Unzeuta, the Supreme Court addressed a Nebraska
statute seeking to retroactively reclaim concurrent criminal
and civil jurisdiction over the Fort Robinson Military
Reservation, a federal enclave.200 The Unzeuta Court struck
down the statute, concluding that after a state cedes exclusive
jurisdiction over an enclave to the federal government, prior
state jurisdiction cannot “be recaptured by the action of the
state alone . . . .”201 Congressional consent is required for a state
to reclaim jurisdiction not reserved at the time of cession.202
191

James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 147 (1937).
Id. at 148.
193
Id. at 143.
194
Id. at 144.
195
Id. at 137.
196
Id. at 149.
197
Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 533 (1885). States also
sometimes retain jurisdiction to tax sales made within an enclave, Collins v. Yosemite
Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 530 (1938), or to operate and make repairs to state
roads intersecting an enclave. United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138, 143 (1930).
198
Lowe, 114 U.S. at 534.
199
Unzeuta, 281 U.S. at 143.
200
Id. at 143.
201
Id.
202
Id. The Supreme Court has held that in the event the federal government
were to wholly abandon a federal enclave, jurisdiction over the parcel would impliedly
return to the surrounding state. S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 563-64 (1946);
Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U.S. 399, 403 (1896). This rule is necessary to prevent
192

524

B.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:2

Enclaves Remain Legally Part of the Surrounding State
Notwithstanding Their Jurisdictional Status

Because a state’s assent to transfer exclusive
jurisdiction terminates its regulatory authority over an
enclave, in the past most courts concluded that such property
“cease[s] to be part of [the surrounding state].”203 The Supreme
Court rejected this reasoning as fallacious in Howard v.
Commissioners of the Sinking Fund.204 In that case, the Court
addressed the purported annexation of a federal enclave by the
city of Louisville, Kentucky.205
In 1947 Congress enacted the Buck Act, authorizing
states and municipalities to collect income taxes from
individuals employed on federal enclaves within their
borders.206 Shortly after passage of the Act, the city of Louisville
enacted an ordinance annexing adjacent territory, including
Naval Ordnance Station Louisville,207 a federal enclave
established in 1941.208 Upon annexing the station, the city
began taxing the incomes of workers employed there.209
A group of station employees challenged the annexation
and the income tax, asserting that the enclave “could not be
annexed by the City since it ceased to be a part of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky when exclusive jurisdiction over it
was acquired by the United States.”210 The Supreme Court
rejected this contention:
When the United States . . . acquired the property upon which the
Ordnance Plant is located, the property did not cease to be a part of
Kentucky. The geographical structure of Kentucky remained the
same. In rearranging the structural divisions of the Commonwealth,
in accordance with state law, the area became a part of the City of

abandoned property from devolving into Hobbesian states of nature. See S.R.A., 327
U.S. at 563-64. But exclusive federal jurisdiction persists so long as the federal
government “continues to hold [the enclave under] its primary jurisdiction and control.”
Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Waggonner, 376 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1964).
203
Howard v. Comm’rs of Sinking Fund of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 626 (1953)
(referring to a decision by a Kentucky trial court).
204
344 U.S. 624.
205
Id. at 624-25.
206
4 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
207
Howard, 344 U.S. at 624-25.
208
Gun Weapon Systems Station Naval Ordnance Station Louisville (NOSL),
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/louisville.htm (last
visited Aug. 29, 2011). The Howard decision never states the formal name of the station.
209
Howard, 344 U.S. at 625.
210
Id. at 626.
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Louisville, just as it remained a part of the County of Jefferson and
the Commonwealth of Kentucky.211

Because the station legally remained a part of
Kentucky, the state retained the power to “conform its
municipal structures to its own plan, so long as the state d[id]
not interfere with the exercise of [exclusive] jurisdiction within
the federal area by the United States.”212 The Howard Court
concluded that the “change of municipal boundaries did not
interfere in the least with the jurisdiction of the United States
within the area or with its use or disposition of the property.”213
Because the annexation was proper, the Buck Act empowered
the city to tax the income of the enclave’s employees.214
While Howard purports to lay to rest the century-old
fiction that a federal enclave constitutes “a state within a
state,”215 the Court reaffirmed the proposition that the
Constitution vested “the United States power to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction within the area,” notwithstanding the
municipal boundaries drawn by the state.216 Kentucky only
possessed the authority to tax incomes earned within the
enclave because Congress authorized it to do so.217 Otherwise, the
state possessed no real power to regulate activities within the
territory.218 Howard’s conclusion that an enclave legally remains
part of the surrounding state is primarily a semantic distinction.
As the Court explained in its most recent enclave decision, from
a regulatory standpoint enclaves “are to [the surrounding state]
as the territory of one of her sister states or a foreign land.”219
C.

Enclave Residents Retain the Right to Vote in State
Elections

The notion commonly embraced before Howard—that
enclaves “ceased to be part of [the surrounding state]”220—imposed
211

Id.
Id. at 626-27.
213
Id. at 627.
214
Id. at 629.
215
Id. at 627. The Court’s conclusion that federal enclaves legally remain part
of the surrounding state is difficult to square with the fact that the District of
Columbia is a federal enclave and Congress’s power to create the District derived from
the Enclave Clause. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263 (1963).
216
Howard, 344 U.S. at 627 (emphasis added).
217
Id. at 628-29.
218
Id. at 627.
219
United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. 363, 378 (1973).
220
Howard, 344 U.S. at 626 (referring to a decision by a Kentucky trial court).
212
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an additional consequence upon residents of federally governed
territory: states routinely denied enclave residents the right to
vote in local elections.221 The Supreme Court struck down this
century-old limitation in Evans v. Cornman.222 Evans addresses an
action brought by residents of the National Institutes of Health
(NIH), a federal enclave located in Maryland, alleging that the
State wrongfully denied them the right to vote.223 Relying on two
grounds, the Court found that the Constitution guaranteed NIH
residents the right to vote in Maryland elections, notwithstanding
the facility’s enclave status.224
First, the Evans Court concluded that state authorities
improperly relied upon the assumption that the appellees were
“not residents of Maryland” because “the NIH grounds ceased
to be a part of Maryland when the enclave was created.”225
Because Howard unequivocally rejects the “fiction” that an
enclave constitutes “a state within a state,” this argument was
untenable and thus “c[ould not] be resurrected . . . to deny
appellees the right to vote.”226
Second, the Court found that NIH residents possessed
substantial interests in the outcome of state elections because
Congress assimilated several components of contemporary
Maryland law into the federalized state law that governed the
enclave.227 NIH residents were subject to Maryland’s criminal law,
its workers’ compensation statute, its wrongful-death act, and its
income taxes.228 Thus, “residents of the NIH grounds [were] just as
interested in and connected with [Maryland’s] electoral decisions
as . . . their neighbors who live[d] off the enclave.”229 By denying
suffrage to the enclave’s residents, Maryland literally subjected
them to “taxation without representation.”230

221

E.g., Herken v. Glynn, 101 P.2d 946, 955 (Kan. 1940) (denying enclave
residents the right to vote on the ground that the State had no jurisdiction over them);
In re Opinion of the Justices, 42 Mass. (1 Met.) 580, 580 (1841) (same); Langdon v.
Jaramillo, 454 P.2d 269, 271 (N.M. 1969) (same); Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306, 317
(1869) (same); McMahon v. Polk, 973 N.W. 77, 78-79 (S.D. 1897) (same); State ex rel.
Lyle v. Willett, 975 S.W. 299, 302-03 (Tenn. 1906) (same).
222
398 U.S. 419 (1970).
223
Id. at 421-22.
224
Id. at 426.
225
Id. at 421.
226
Id. at 421-22 (citing Howard v. Comm’rs of Sinking Fund of Louisville, 344
U.S. 624, 627 (1953)).
227
Id. at 423-24.
228
Id. at 424.
229
Id. at 426.
230
JOHN JOACHIM ZUBLY, A HUMBLE ENQUIRY (1769), reprinted in PAMPHLETS
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1750-76 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1965).
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Evans ultimately concludes that the Constitution
guarantees enclave residents the right to vote notwithstanding
the exercise of “exclusive federal jurisdiction” because the
“differences . . . between . . . residents who live on federal
enclaves and those who [live in the surrounding state] are far
more theoretical than real.”231
IV.

THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE BARS COURTS FROM APPLYING
MODERN CHOICE-OF-LAW BALANCING TESTS TO CLAIMS
ARISING FROM CONDUCT OR TRANSACTIONS WITHIN
FEDERAL ENCLAVES

Modern choice-of-law rules frequently authorize courts to
apply a state’s law to an action arising from conduct that did not
occur in that state.232 Courts applying these methodologies
typically determine the applicable law by balancing the relative
interests of the jurisdictions possessing contacts with the action.233
For example, in one oft-cited conflicts decision, the New
York Court of Appeals applied New York law to a personalinjury suit stemming from an accident between two New
Yorkers on an Ontario highway.234 The court concluded that
“[c]omparison of the relative ‘contacts’ and ‘interests’ . . . make
it clear that the concern of New York [wa]s unquestionably the
greater and more direct” and Ontario’s interests were “at best
minimal.”235 This was so because the action “involve[d] injuries
sustained by a New York[er] . . . as the result of the [alleged]
negligence of a [second] New York[er] . . . in the operation of an
automobile . . . insured in New York.”236 Conversely, “Ontario’s
sole relationship with the occurrence [wa]s the purely
adventitious circumstance that the accident occurred there.”237
Thus, New York’s law governed because New York’s interests
outweighed Ontario’s.
231

Evans, 398 U.S. at 424-25.
See generally Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 1041 (1987) (discussing various choice-of-law methodologies).
233
Lawrence C. George, Asking the Right Questions, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
449, 460 (1987). I have criticized the modern choice of law methodology as an
“‘inherently indeterminate and manipulable doctrine,’ which, in a great many cases,
may be used to rationalize whatever law the judge feels inclined to apply.” Chad
DeVeaux, Lost in the Dismal Swamp: Interstate Class Actions, False Federalism, and
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1037 (2011) (quoting
Campbell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 890, 893 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999)).
234
Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 (N.Y. 1963).
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
232
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Enclaves “are to [the surrounding state] as the territory
of one of her sister states.”238 Therefore, if two New Yorkers who
reside outside of a federal enclave litigate over an incident that
occurred within an enclave, one might be tempted to argue that
the court should apply modern New York law rather than the
enclave’s federalized state law because New York possesses a
greater interest in the litigation’s outcome. But this is not so.
Enclave law, unlike state law, is distinctly federal in
nature, notwithstanding the fact that it usually originated as
state law.239 As such, the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause
precludes courts from balancing such competing interests
because federal law, when constitutionally authorized, always
supersedes state law.240 “The supremacy clause . . . establishes a
constitutional choice-of-law rule, mak[ing] federal law
paramount . . . .”241
This principle bars the application of the interestbalancing tests employed by most states in choice-of-law
cases.242 The Supremacy Clause, in effect, dictates that courts
apply the traditional lex loci doctrine—that “the law of the
[place] where the wrong occurred” governs an action243—to
transactions arising within federal enclaves. The McGlinn
doctrine dictates that when the pertinent events giving rise to
a suit “occurred on a federal enclave” the court must apply the
federalized state law applicable on the enclave.244 Thus, if a
New York driver were to sue another New Yorker for damages
to his car resulting from a collision within the confines of the
Gateway National Recreation Area, a federal enclave lying on
238

United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. 363, 378 (1973).
James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940).
240
Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 178 (1976).
241
Viva! Int’l Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc.,
162 P.3d 569, 571 (Cal. 2007).
242
See Hancock, 426 U.S. at 178 (stating that because enclave law is federal,
the Supremacy Clause dictates that it supersedes state law).
243
LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 17 (4th ed. 1995).
244
Snow v. Bechtel Constr., Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1514, 1521 (C.D. Cal. 1986);
accord Klausner v. Lucas Film Entm’t Co., No. 09-03502 CW, 2010 WL 1038228, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010) (determining whether a claim arises on a federal enclave
requires courts look to see where all the pertinent events took place); Rosseter v. Indus.
Light & Magic, No. C 08-04545 WHA, 2009 WL 210452, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2009)
(stating that the fact that defendant accused of tort maintains operations outside
federal enclave is not pertinent in determining law applied to events occurring within
enclave); McMullen v. S. Cal. Edison, No. EDCV 08-957-VAP (PJWx), 2008 WL
4948664, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2008) (same); Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp., 497 F. Supp.
2d 1138, 1148 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (determining whether a claim arises on a federal enclave
requires courts look to see where all the pertinent events took place); Kelly v. Lockheed
Martin Servs. Grp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.P.R. 1998) (same); Lockhart v. MVM, Inc., 97
Cal. Rptr. 3d 206, 211-12 (Ct. App. 2009).
239
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the outskirts of New York City,245 the Supremacy Clause
dictates that a reviewing court would have to apply the
enclave’s strict contributory-negligence bar—which survives as
federalized state law—rather than New York’s modern
comparative-fault law.246 This is so notwithstanding the fact
that New York possesses materially greater interests in the
outcome of the litigation than the federal government.247
V.

THE MCGLINN DOCTRINE CONVERTS ENCLAVES INTO
JURISPRUDENTIAL JURASSIC PARKS

While the ACA incorporates modern state criminal law,
Congress has made little effort to update the body of private law
applicable in its aging enclaves. As a result, federal enclaves—
which encompass almost 30 percent the United States248—have
devolved into jurisprudential Jurassic Parks, where long-dead
legal doctrines prey upon unsuspecting litigants. The Presidio of
San Francisco exemplifies this phenomenon.
California ceded exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidio to the
federal government in 1897 to establish an army base.249 Today, the
Presidio, now administered by the National Parks Service,250 is a
bustling commercial center, home to thousands of people and the
site of millions of dollars of commercial sales each year.251
As noted in the introduction, in 2005, I represented a
pro bono client, who resided on the Presidio, in an unlawfuldetainer action.252 I removed the case to federal court on the
basis of federal-question jurisdiction because the law governing
his suit was California’s 1872 unlawful-detainer statute, which
lived on as federalized state law.253 Fortunately, my client did
245

See Friends of Gateway v. Slater, 257 F.3d 74, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2001).
Congress established this enclave in 1972. Gateway National Recreation
Area Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 460cc (2006). New York first enacted the comparativefault doctrine in 1975. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411 (McKinney 1997). The contributorynegligence doctrine would not apply to a personal-injury claim (as opposed to a
property-damage claim) because Congress has incorporated contemporary state
personal-injury law into enclave law. 16 U.S.C. § 457.
247
See Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 425 (1970) (noting the
“differences . . . between . . . residents who live on federal enclaves and those who [live
in the surrounding state] are far more theoretical than real”).
248
Turley, supra note 28, at 362.
249
Standard Oil Co. v. California, 291 U.S. 242, 244 (1934); Consol. Milk
Producers v. Parker, 123 P.2d 440, 441 (1942).
250
Presidio of San Francisco Act of 1996, 16 U.S.C. § 460bb.
251
Levy, supra note 55, at A-1.
252
See Swords to Plowshares v. Kemp, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
253
As federalized law, the “assimilated state [unlawful detainer] law [wa]s
distinctly federal in nature,” thus “its application establishe[d] the basis for federal
246
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not assert that his landlord breached the implied warranty of
habitability. California did not recognize the existence of such a
warranty until 1974, and thus it is not a part of the body of law
governing the Presidio.254 The prior rule—which originated in
the Middle Ages255—still prevails: “[T]he lessor is not obligated
to repair unless he covenants to do so in the written lease
contract.”256 The eviction statute applicable on the Presidio does
offer one potentially troubling advantage to tenants; unlike
modern statutes, the commission of a nuisance is not a valid
ground for evicting a tenant.257
Other proverbial dinosaurs roam the enclave. California
eliminated the tort of alienation of affections258 in 1939.259 Yet
this long-dead cause of action lives on in the Presidio as a sort
of zombie tort.260 If one of the many thousands of Presidio
residents were to carry on an extramarital affair with a
neighbor, her jilted spouse could sue her lover.261 If the
paramour were himself engaged to another woman residing in
the Presidio, his would-be bride could likewise sue him for
breach of contract to marry.262 California also eliminated this
cause of action in 1939.263 The Presidio’s enclave status would,
however, afford the lothario wide latitude to retaliate for these
suits that he would not enjoy in other parts of the city. The
causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
and invasion of privacy do not exist on the enclave. California

question jurisdiction.” Id. at 1038. My client resided in federal housing. Swords to
Plowshares v. Kemp, No. C05-01661MJJ, 2005 WL 3882063, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18,
2005). I removed the case to federal court because I planned to challenge his eviction on
due-process grounds and I preferred to make this argument before a federal forum.
This strategy proved successful. Id. at *1-2.
254
Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168, 1182 (Cal. 1974).
255
Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
256
Id. at 1076.
257
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161 (Deering 1906). California’s contemporary
unlawful detainer statute includes “nuisance” as a ground for terminating tenancy.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161(4) (West 2009).
258
“[T]he common-law cause of action for alienation of affections had three
elements: ‘(1) some wrongful conduct by the defendant with the plaintiff’s spouse, (2) the
loss of affection or loss of consortium of plaintiff’s spouse, and (3) a causal relationship
between the defendant’s conduct and the loss of consortium.’” Goutam U. Jois, Note,
Marital Status as Property: Toward a New Jurisprudence for Gay Rights, 41 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 509, 533-34 (2006) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 80 (8th ed. 2004)).
259
CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.5 (West 1939).
260
The lower federal courts have uniformly held that common-law rules in
effect at the moment of cession live on until abrogated by Congress. See cases cited
supra note 26.
261
Barlow v. Barnes, 155 P. 457, 457 (Cal. 1916).
262
Buelna v. Ryan, 73 P. 466, 467 (Cal. 1903).
263
CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.5(d).
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did not recognize the emotional-distress tort until 1950.264 It
first recognized the privacy action in 1973.265
The Presidio is home to a high-end bicycle shop.266 Bike
sales conducted at the shop are not governed by the UCC—
which California did not adopt until 1965267—but rather by
nineteenth-century common law. Sales include no implied
warranties. Rather, they are subject to the doctrine of caveat
emptor.268 The bicycle shop is also immune from California’s
consumer-protection and false-advertising laws, which were
not enacted until 1941.269 If a car struck the rider of a bicycle
within the boundaries of the enclave, the driver could avoid
liability for damage to the bike by simply demonstrating any
contributory negligence by the rider.270 California did not adopt
the comparative-fault doctrine until 1975.271
Perhaps most troubling of all, private companies employ
several thousand workers at the Presidio.272 The enclave is the
home of George Lucas’s special-effects studio, Industrial Light &
Magic, which alone employs more than 1500 people.273 California,
like most states, provides significantly greater employment-law
rights and remedies to workers than the federal government
provides.274 Yet, Presidio workers—most of whom presumably
reside outside the enclave—enjoy only the modest protections of
264

Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 216 P.2d 571, 572-73 (Cal. App. 1950); see also
Cooper v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 170 F. App’x 496, 497 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that
common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress not cognizable on federal
enclave established before state supreme court recognized cause of action); Stiefel v.
Bechtel Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1149 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (same); Celli v. Schoell, 995
F. Supp. 1337, 1343-44 (D. Utah 1998) (same).
265
Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 109 Cal. Rptr. 269, 272 (Ct. App. 1973).
266
Paul McHugh, Sports Basement Ready to Shake, S.F. CHRON., June 14,
2007, at D-7.
267
Marguerite Lee De Voll, Comment, Neither “Free” nor “Clear”: The Real
Costs of In re PW, LLC: A Look at § 363(F)(3) and How to Protect Creditors, 26 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 167, 186 (2009).
268
Watson v. Sutro, 24 P. 172, 179 (Cal. 1890).
269
Mersnick v. USProtect Corp., No. C-06-03993 RMW, 2007 WL 2669816, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2007) (holding that California consumer-protection law, CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200, inapplicable on federal enclave established before its
enactment); see Pfizer Inc. v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 840, 843 (Ct. App. 2006)
(noting that California’s consumer protection and false advertising statutes were
enacted in 1941).
270
See Basler v. Sacramento Gas & Elec. Co., 111 P. 530, 531-32 (Cal. 1910).
The contributory-negligence doctrine would not apply to a personal-injury claim (as
opposed to a property-damage claim) because Congress has incorporated contemporary
state personal-injury law into enclave law. 16 U.S.C. § 457 (2006).
271
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Cal. 1975).
272
Levy, supra note 55, at A-1.
273
Id.
274
Romer-Friedman, supra note 41, at 503, 508, 511, 516.
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laissez faire nineteenth-century state labor laws275 simply
because they work in a two square-mile276 “federal island”277
within San Francisco.278 This is not an anomaly. The Presidio is
just one of five thousand federal enclaves established by
Congress throughout the United States.279 Collectively, these
enclaves are home to more than a million people.280
Much of the blame for this state of affairs lies with
Congress. The rule of international law upon which Canter and
McGlinn rest presupposes that upon accepting jurisdiction over
territory, a new sovereign will promptly establish new laws to
govern the territory. The assimilation of existing municipal laws
is intended only to serve as a stop-gap measure to prevent “a
hiatus in the legal system of the . . . enclave.”281 Incorporated laws
are not meant to survive into perpetuity because the new
sovereign assumes an obligation to actually govern the territory.282
For instance, when the United States acquired Florida from
Spain, the United States promptly established a territorial
legislature to govern the cession.283 “The power of Congress over
federal enclaves . . . is . . . the same as the power of Congress over
the District of Columbia.”284 When the federal government
assumed jurisdiction over the District, the laws of Maryland
likewise lived on as federalized state law.285 But Congress
governed the District of Columbia.286 Congress has failed to
provide such leadership for the multitude of other federal
enclaves it established in the centuries that followed. As a result,

275

Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive
Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 766 (2009).
276
Carl Nolte, The Chance of a Lifetime at the Presidio, S.F. CHRON., June 14,
1991, at A-21.
277
United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. 363, 375 (1973).
278
The Presidio remains a part of San Francisco notwithstanding its
jurisdictional status. Howard v. Comm’rs of Sinking Fund of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624,
626-27 (1953).
279
Adams v. Clinton, No. 1:98CV01665, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22848, at *13
(D.D.C. June 30, 1998).
280
Id.
281
Bd. of Supervisors v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 563 (E.D. Va. 1976);
accord James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1940).
282
See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Donoho, 356 P.2d 267, 271 (Colo. 1960)
(asserting that adoption of preexisting state laws was intended to temporarily “fill the
vacuum which would otherwise exist” in enclave private law).
283
Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 541-42 (1828).
284
Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263 (1963).
285
Busby v. Elec. Utils. Emps. Union, 323 U.S. 72, 73 (1944).
286
Armstrong v. Lear, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 169, 176 (1827).
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nearly 30 percent of the United States287 has devolved into a
“sanctuary for the obsolete restrictions of the common law.”288
VI.

THE MCGLINN DOCTRINE HAS PERNICIOUS EFFECTS
UPON LABOR LAW

Like other aspects of municipal law, state labor laws
federalize at the moment a state cedes jurisdiction over an enclave
to the federal government.289 In James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula,
the Supreme Court affirmed the application of a New York
workplace-safety law on a federal enclave because the state
enacted the law before cession.290 But state labor laws enacted after
cession “are not a part of the body of laws in [an enclave]” because
“[c]ongressional action is necessary to keep [them] current.”291
Today, almost every state provides its workers with
greater rights and remedies than federal law mandates.292 As
one commentator noted,
There are four main circumstances where a worker is substantively
better off under state law than under federal law, including when
(1) the state law provides an affirmative right, but the federal
government has no equivalent right; (2) the federal law exempts a
worker from protection, but the state law has no exemption; (3) the
state law standard is more rigorous than the equivalent federal
standard . . . ; and (4) the state law provides a greater remedy or
time period to recover than federal law.293

The precise situations where state labor law affords employees
greater rights and remedies than federal law are too numerous
to chronicle in detail here. Nonetheless, a few notable examples
merit discussion.
Eighteen states guarantee employees a higher
minimum wage than federal law requires.294 Several states give
employees significantly greater rights to medical leave to care
for ailing family members than federal law provides.295 Twelve
287

Turley, supra note 28, at 362.
Capetola v. Barclay-White Co., 48 F. Supp. 797, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
289
James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 103-04 (1940).
290
Id. at 104-05.
291
Id. at 100.
292
Romer-Friedman, supra note 41, at 503.
293
Id. at 503-04.
294
The federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206 (West,
Westlaw through 2010 Sess.). As of January 1, 2012, eighteen states impose a higher
minimum wage than required by federal law. Minimum Wage Laws in the States, U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR (Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm.
295
Michael J. Hayes, Leaving Maryland Workers Behind: A Comparison of State
Employee Leave Statutes, 9 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIG., GENDER & CLASS 19, 28 (2009).
288
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states afford employees the right to receive benefits for
dependents and domestic partners not provided by federal
law.296 Five jurisdictions, California, Colorado, Nevada, Alaska,
and Puerto Rico297—among the national leaders in federal land
holdings298—require overtime pay for work exceeding a
designated number of hours per day, while federal law only
requires overtime for work in excess of forty hours per week.299
While federal law prohibits discrimination “based on
race, sex, age, religion, national origin, and disability,” several
states expand such protections to groups outside the ambit of
federal law.300 The federal Occupational Safety and Health Act
imposes minimum workplace safety requirements on all
employers.301 But most states have opted to establish their own
parallel statutes, many of which impose significantly more
stringent safety standards and enforcement schemes than
federal law requires.302
In addition, many states that have opted not to impose
employment rules more rigorous than federal law nonetheless
offer employees more significant state remedies for violations of
the federally mandated standards.303 Because Congress
established most federal enclaves prior to 1940,304 civilians
California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin provide employees greater rights to medical leave
to care for ailing family members than the federal Family and Medical Leave Act. State
Family Leave Laws that Are More Expansive than the Federal FMLA, NAT’L P’SHIP FOR
WOMEN & FAMILIES, http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/Statesandunpaid
FMLLaws.pdf?docID=968 (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). These states provide employees
greater rights to leave by expanding the family and medical leave requirements to
businesses not covered by the FMLA, “allowing leave to be taken for additional purposes
than those listed by the federal law, or providing a greater number of weeks of leave.”
Hayes, supra at 28.
296
CAL. LAB. CODE § 233 (West 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-1m (West Supp.
2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-6 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2319-A (Supp. 2010);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (Supp. 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-32 (West Supp. 2011);
OR. REV. STAT. § 106.340 (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-12-1 (Supp. 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 8 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.60.015 (West Supp. 2011).
297
Federal enclaves within Puerto Rico are subject to the same treatment as
enclaves within the fifty states. See Kelly v. Lockheed Martin Servs. Grp., 25 F. Supp.
2d 1, 5 (D.P.R. 1998).
298
Federal Lands in the Fifty States, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Oct. 1996.
299
Questions and Answers About the FLSA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/whd/flsa/faq.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).
300
Jarod S. Gonzalez, State Antidiscrimination Statutes and Implied Preemption
of Common Law Torts: Valuing the Common Law, 59 S.C. L. REV. 115, 116 (2007).
301
29 U.S.C. § 651 (2006).
302
Note, Getting Away with Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal
Prosecutions for Industrial Accidents, 101 HARV. L. REV. 535, 538-39 & n.27 (1987).
303
Romer-Friedman, supra note 41, at 504.
304
Most federal enclaves were established between 1840 and 1940. Wilkinson,
supra note 12, at 152 n.21; see also supra note 53.
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employed on enclaves typically enjoy none of these rights.
Indeed, nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century legislatures
and courts expressed open hostility to working people and
those who sought greater rights for laborers.305
Federal courts routinely dismiss claims brought by
enclave employees premised upon alleged violations of state
labor laws enacted after the cession of jurisdiction.306 George
Lucas’s Presidio-based special effects studio, Industrial Light &
Magic, itself has been subject to two discrimination suits
premised upon California labor law.307 On both occasions, the
courts dismissed the state-law claims because California
enacted the applicable statutes after the federal government
assumed jurisdiction over the Presidio.308
The lower federal courts have also unnecessarily
compounded the problem by misreading the Supreme Court’s
decision in Arlington Hotel v. Fant to hold that state commonlaw rules, like statutes, freeze in time at the moment of cession
until altered by Congress.309 This places enclave workers at a
serious disadvantage vis-à-vis their counterparts employed
outside federal boundaries.
Modern state common law typically affords victims of
workplace harassment a right to invoke the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress to redress trauma stemming
from abusive work environments.310 Because judicial recognition
305

McKay v. Retail Auto. Salesmen’s Local Union, 106 P.2d 373, 377 (Cal.
1940), superseded by CAL LAB. CODE § 1115 (West 1947), as recognized in Chavez v.
Sargent, 339 P.2d 801, 825 (Cal. 1959).
306
E.g., Manning v. Gold Belt Falcon, LLC, 681 F. Supp. 2d 574, 576 (D.N.J.
2010) (holding that state wage-and-hour statutes inapplicable on federal enclave);
Klausner v. Lucas Film Entm’t Co., No. 09-03502 CW, 2010 WL 1038228, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 19, 2010) (holding that state employment discrimination statute inapplicable
on federal enclave); Rosseter v. Indus. Light & Magic, No. C08-04545 WHA, 2009 WL
210452, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2009) (same); Mersnick v. USProtect Corp., No. C-0603993 RMW, 2007 WL 2669816, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2007) (holding that state
wage-and-hour statutes inapplicable on federal enclave); Janulewicz v. Bechtel Corp.,
No. 06-CV-1413-H (WMC), 2007 WL 2462110, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2007) (holding
that state occupational safety laws inapplicable on federal enclave); Hutchinson v.
Andrulis Corp., No. 5:03CV1-MCR/WCS, 2004 WL 691790, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 19,
2004) (holding that state wrongful-termination statute inapplicable on federal enclave);
Kelly v. Lockheed Martin Servs. Grp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.P.R. 1998) (holding that
state employment discrimination statute inapplicable on federal enclave); George v.
UXB Int’l, Inc., No. C-95-20048-JW, 1996 WL 241624, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 1996)
(holding that state wage-and-hour statutes inapplicable on federal enclave); Miller v.
Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 697, 699-700 (W.D. Mo. 1992) (holding that state
employment discrimination statute inapplicable on federal enclave).
307
Klausner, 2010 WL 1038228, at *4; Rosseter, 2009 WL 210452, at *2.
308
Klausner, 2010 WL 1038228, at *4; Rosseter, 2009 WL 210452, at *2.
309
See supra Part I.C.
310
Gonzalez, supra note 300, at 132-33.
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of this tort postdates the establishment of virtually all federal
enclaves,311 federal courts regularly deny enclave workers’ suits
premised on this claim for relief.312
A vast majority of states now recognize a cause of action
for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.313 State
supreme courts first recognized these claims in the latter half of
the twentieth century, most in the early 1980s.314 Prior to that
time, such actions were strictly barred by the at-will
employment doctrine.315 Courts routinely deny wrongfultermination claims by enclave employees cognizable under state
law because such actions did not exist at the time of cession.316
A series of cases involving the dismissal of workers
employed at California’s San Onofre Nuclear Generating
Station illustrates the potential injustice of this precedent. In
1963, the Southern California Edison Company acquired an
easement from the Secretary of the Navy to build the San
Onofre station on the Camp Pendleton Naval Reservation,317 a
federal enclave near San Diego.318 The federal government
acquired exclusive jurisdiction over Camp Pendleton in 1942.319
Between 1986 and 2009, at least four San Onofre–based
employees brought suit against Southern California Edison or
general contractors it retained, alleging they were terminated

311

Most federal enclaves were established between 1840 and 1940. Wilkinson,
supra note 12, at 152 n.21; see also supra note 53.
312
E.g., Cooper v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 170 F. App’x 496, 497-98 (9th Cir. 2006)
(holding that common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress not
cognizable on federal enclave established before state supreme court recognized cause
of action); Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1149 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (same);
Celli v. Shoell, 995 F. Supp. 1337, 1343-44 (D. Utah 1998) (same).
313
Richard A. Lord, The At-Will Relationship in the 21st Century: A
Consideration of Consideration, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 707, 774 n.154 (2006).
314
Id. (noting that Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 386-87
(Conn. 1980), was one of the first decisions to recognize this cause of action).
315
Id. at 708.
316
E.g., Cooper, 170 F. App’x at 497-98; Stuckstede v. NJVC LLC, No.
4:09CV0663 JCH, 2010 WL 234953, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 15, 2010); McMullen v. S. Cal.
Edison, No. EDCV 08-957-VAP (PJWx), 2008 WL 4948664, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17,
2008); Janulewicz v. Bechtel Corp., No. 06-CV-1413-H (WMC), 2007 WL 2462110, at *4
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2007); Sundaram v. Brookhaven Nat’l Lab., 424 F. Supp. 2d 545,
570 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Hutchinson v. Andrulis Corp., No. 5:03CV1-MCR/WCS, 2004 WL
691790, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2004); Snow v. Bechtel Constr. Inc., 647 F. Supp.
1514, 1521 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Orlovetz v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 848 P.2d 463, 466-67
(Kan. Ct. App. 1993).
317
McMullen, 2008 WL 4948664, at *2 n.2.
318
United States v. Hernandez, 739 F.2d 484, 485 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that
Camp Pendleton is located forty miles north of San Diego).
319
McMullen, 2008 WL 4948664, at *2.
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in retaliation for reporting safety violations at the station.320
One of the employees alleged Edison fired him in retaliation for
reporting violations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.321 A
fifth worker sued Edison alleging the company terminated him
for reporting workplace harassment at the station.322 The
California courts first sustained the common law claim of
wrongful termination in violation of public policy in 1959.323
Camp Pendleton succumbed to federal jurisdiction in 1942.324
Thus, in all five cases the federal courts dismissed the alleged
whistleblower’s action because the common law wrongfultermination tort was not part of the enclave’s law.325
Congress undoubtedly possesses a strong interest in
seeing that military personnel and federal workers employed
on federal enclaves are immune from state labor laws. Private
employers like Southern California Edison and George Lucas—
based on the mere happenstance of their locus on federal
enclaves—deserve no such immunity. The immunity they
presently enjoy stems not from a conscious decision to protect
them, but rather from the federal government’s failure to keep
enclave private law current.326 As a result of this abdication,
Camp Pendleton and the Presidio’s enclave status afford
Edison and Lucas protections that a squadron of imperial
storm troopers would envy.
VII.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS POSED BY THE
MCGLINN DOCTRINE

I propose a two-prong solution to the centuries-old
federal-enclave problem. First, the federal courts, not Congress,
should assume responsibility for keeping enclave common law
current. Lower federal court precedent is erroneous in
320

Cooper, 170 F. App’x at 497; Bussey v. Edison Int’l, Inc., No. CV 08-0158
AHM (RCx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14057, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2009); Stiefel v.
Bechtel Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1149 (S.D. Cal. 2007); Snow, 647 F. Supp. at 1521.
321
Bussey, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14057, at *9.
322
McMullen, 2008 WL 4948664, at *7-8.
323
Cooper, 170 F. App’x at 497 (citing Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,
344 P.2d 25 (Cal. App. 1959)). California adopted the wrongful-termination tort long
before the cause of action was recognized in other states. See Lord, supra note 313, at
774-75 n.154.
324
Cooper, 170 F. App’x at 497.
325
Id. at 497-98; Bussey, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14057, at *9-10; McMullen,
2008 WL 4948664, at *7-9; Stiefel, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1149; Snow, 647 F. Supp. at
1521. The San Onofre dismissals are of particular concern to me because I live within
the plant’s fall-out zone.
326
James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940).
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concluding that the federal-enclave doctrine freezes in time
state common-law rules. As federal instrumentalities, enclaves
fall within the ambit of federal common law. It is well settled
that in promulgating federal common law, the Constitution
endows federal courts with the discretion to simply borrow
from the ready-made common law of the surrounding state.327
Thus, in most enclave-based cases, federal courts should simply
apply the surrounding state’s common-law rules.
Second, with respect to state labor codes, which generally
fall outside the courts’ traditional common-lawmaking authority,
I propose that Congress enact an Assimilative Labor Act—in the
spirit of the ACA—affording the rights and remedies provided by
contemporary state labor statutes to nongovernmental workers
employed within federal enclaves.
A.

Enclave Status Should Not Freeze a Territory’s Common
Law
1. Private-Law Rules Applied in Actions Arising on
Federal Enclaves Are Properly Governed by Federal
Common Law

Congress bears significant responsibility for the
nonsensical state of the law governing federal enclaves.328
Notwithstanding this legislative abdication, the most
confounding aspects of enclave law could be remedied by the
federal courts without the involvement of the political branches
of government. The lower federal courts have uniformly
misread the Supreme Court’s decision in Arlington Hotel v.
Fant to apply the McGlinn doctrine to existing state commonlaw rules.329 None of the Supreme Court’s enclave decisions
actually address McGlinn’s effect on enclave common law.
The Enclave Clause empowers Congress “[t]o exercise
exclusive Legislation” over federal enclaves.330 But the
Constitution is silent concerning the status of enclave common
331
law. Precedent demonstrates that state courts necessarily
327

California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 283
(1982) (citing Bd. of Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939)).
328
See supra Part V.
329
See supra Part I.C.
330
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
331
This is probably so because at the time of the founding, legal scholars
generally viewed common law not as a form of government action, but rather as “‘a
transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it
unless and until changed by statute.’” Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938)
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lose their power to promulgate common-law rules for enclaves
as each enclave is “to [the surrounding state] as the territory of
one of her sister states or a foreign land.”332 But the
Constitution does not require that enclave common law cease
to evolve at the moment the federal government assumes
jurisdiction. As federal instrumentalities, enclaves fall within
the ambit of federal common law. History supports this
position.
“The
power
of
Congress
over
federal
enclaves . . . is . . . the same as the power of Congress over the
District of Columbia.”333 The laws of Maryland lived on as
federalized state law within the District for a time after federal
acquisition.334 Until Congress established the District’s own
Court of Appeals in 1970,335 the equivalent of a state supreme
court, the District was subject to federal common law
promulgated by Article III judges.336 While the population of
Washington, D.C., exceeds that of other federal properties,
many more people live or work collectively within other
enclaves than in the District,337 and they deserve the same
treatment as D.C. residents.338
State regulatory authority over an enclave is
extinguished at the moment of cession. But as with the District
of Columbia, the regulatory power assumed by the United States
as the new sovereign should be divided between the branches of
the federal government in the usual fashion. Congress assumes
exclusive legislative jurisdiction and thus the federal courts
should logically assume the common-lawmaking role
(quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 53236 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). Courts viewed this “transcendental body of law” as
universally applicable irrespective of what sovereign governed a particular territory
unless its legislature specifically enacted a statute abrogating it. Id. Thus, when a
federal enclave was established, the “transcendental body” of common law remained
applicable both inside and outside the enclave unless Congress enacted a statute
abrogating it. Id.
332
United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. 363, 378 (1973).
333
Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263 (1963).
334
Busby v. Elec. Utils. Emps. Union, 323 U.S. 72, 73 (1944).
335
M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 311-12 (D.C. 1971).
336
Peter L. Strauss, Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53 ALA. L. REV.
891, 907 (2002); M.A.P., 285 A.2d at 311-12.
337
See Mirel, supra note 11, at B01 (“Millions of people live in so-called
federal enclaves, those territories that have been purchased by, or ceded to, the federal
government for use as military bases, national parks and other federal facilities.”);
Thompson & Williams, supra note 11, at B02 (noting that “the millions of federal
enclave residents enjoy congressional representation—by voting either in their home
state or the state where the enclave is located”).
338
It should be noted that federal enclave residents do possess one important
right not possessed by D.C. residents: the right to vote in congressional elections.
Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1970).
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traditionally occupied by the judicial branch. This is consistent
with the rule of international law applied in American Insurance
Co. v. Canter upon which the McGlinn doctrine is based.339
Canter presumes “that whenever political jurisdiction” is
“transferred from one nation or sovereign to another,” existing
laws will remain in force indefinitely as the new sovereign
assumes the functions previously performed by the outgoing
government.340 The former sovereign’s laws live on for a time to
prevent “a hiatus in the legal system of the [territory],”341 but the
instrumentalities of the new sovereign’s administration may
change them in any manner permissible within its system of
government.342 In common-law countries, judges assume the
primary responsibility for promulgating private-law rules.343
Thus, when dominion over territory passes from one commonlaw jurisdiction to another, the new sovereign’s courts should
inherit the common-lawmaking responsibility from those of the
former, just as the new sovereign’s assembly inherits legislative
responsibility from its predecessor.
When the United States achieved independence from
Great Britain, each of the new states “received”344 “the common
law of England [then] . . . in force” as “the rule of decision” in
private-law cases until altered by their new governments.345
Independence divested the Crown and its courts of jurisdiction
over the states, but this did not terminate the existing body of
common law, nor did it freeze that law in time until changed by
the legislative branches of the new state governments.346 The state
courts inherited the responsibility for maintaining the body of
common law and the power to create new doctrines and abrogate
rules promulgated by their English predecessors.347 When the
339

See supra Part I.A.
Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 546-47 (1885)
(citing Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828)).
341
Bd. of Supervisors v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 563 (E.D. Va. 1976);
accord James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1940).
342
Sadrakula, 309 U.S. at 99 (noting that state laws promulgated by state
legislatures live on as federal law within enclaves “until abrogated” by Congress).
343
Tomlinson, supra note 130, at 107.
344
Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of
Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29 (2009).
345
Michael G. Collins, Justice Iredell, Choice of Law, and the Constitution—A
Neglected Encounter, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 163, 169 (2006) (referring to Virginia’s
Receiving Act acknowledging receipt of the English common law until abrogated); see
also Bellia & Clark, supra note 344, at 29 (noting that each of the thirteen original
states expressly acknowledged “receiving” the English common law as the rule of
decision in private-law cases after obtaining independence from Great Britain).
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Bellia & Clark, supra note 344, at 29.
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federal government assumes jurisdiction from a state, existing
state common law should live on as English common law did. The
courts of the new sovereign—the federal government—should
inherit responsibility for maintaining that body of law.
Adoption of the federal-common-law model I propose
would obviate the bulk of the jurisprudential anomalies presented
by the McGlinn doctrine. While state legislatures occasionally
intervene to correct perceived deficiencies, both historically and in
modern times, the vast majority of private-law development rests
with the courts in their common-lawmaking function.348 Indeed,
state legislatures have traditionally demonstrated indifference to
the development of private law.349
Recognition that enclave private law falls within the
ambit of federal common law would empower federal courts to
extinguish zombie-torts like alienation of affections and to place
enclave citizens and workers, like the civilian employees of the
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, on equal footing with
their counterparts employed outside the enclave’s borders.350
Denying enclave residents and employees such rights furthers
no federal policy. The “differences . . . between . . . residents who
live on federal enclaves and those who [live in the surrounding
state] are far more theoretical than real.”351
2. Federal Courts Should Ordinarily Borrow the
Common-Law Rules of the Surrounding State
Assumption of common-lawmaking responsibility for
federal enclaves imposes only modest responsibility on federal
courts. In the vast majority of cases, reviewing courts should
simply “borrow” the surrounding state’s common-law rules for
application within enclaves. It is well settled that matters
falling within the ambit of federal common law “do not
348

Tomlinson, supra note 130, at 107. The McGlinn Court likely did not
envision the modern state of federal-enclave law because pursuant to the Swift v.
Tyson doctrine, then applicable, common law was viewed not as a form of state action,
but rather as “‘a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but
obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute.’” Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-36 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). Thus, when a federal enclave
was established, the “transcendental body” of common law remained applicable both
inside and outside the enclave unless Congress enacted a statute abrogating it. Id.
349
Peck, supra note 63, at 270.
350
Application of this principle would also put an end to the jurisprudential
“crazy quilt” problem existing in enclaves consisting of tracts of land acquired at
different times. See supra Part I.E.
351
Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 425 (1970).
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inevitably require resort to uniform federal rules.”352 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that, when
appropriate, state common law may be “borrowed and applied
as the federal [common-law] rule for deciding the substantive
legal issue at hand.”353 As the Court said in United States v.
Kimbell Foods, Inc., “Whether to [borrow] state [common] law
or to fashion a nationwide federal [common law] rule is a
matter of judicial policy ‘dependent upon a variety of
considerations always relevant to the nature of the specific
governmental interests and to the effects upon them of
applying state law.’”354
Federal courts engaging in the common-lawmaking
process must make a case-by-case determination whether to
fashion a federal rule or borrow applicable state law. Matters
that require law that is “uniform in character throughout the
Nation necessitate formulation of controlling federal [commonlaw] rules.”355 “Conversely, when there is little need for a
nationally uniform body of law, state law may be incorporated
as the federal rule of decision.”356 Further, “[a]part from
considerations of uniformity,” the reviewing court “must also
determine whether application of state law would frustrate
specific [federal] objectives” and if so, the court “must fashion
special rules solicitous of those federal interests.”357
Federal courts should not necessarily borrow state
common law in matters involving military personnel or
government employees acting in their official capacities, but I
posit that in the overwhelming majority of cases involving
civilians or government officials acting in their private
capacities, the courts should borrow law from the surrounding
state. The Kimbell Foods factors weigh heavily in favor of this
proposal. No need exists for a nationally uniform body of federal
common law to govern suits between civilians arising within
enclaves. The bulk of litigants involved in actions arising on
enclaves are likely to be residents of the state encompassing the
enclave. Thus, the surrounding state is likely to possess
352

United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-28 (1979).
California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 283
(1982) (citing Bd. of Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939)); accord Kimbell
Foods, 440 U.S. at 727-28.
354
Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
332 U.S. 301, 310 (1947)).
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materially greater interests in seeing that the policy decisions
underlying its common-law rules are applied to the litigants.
Moreover, the litigants involved in these suits are much more
likely to be aware of the private-law rules of the surrounding
state than of post hoc rules promulgated by federal courts.358
Kimbell Foods’s final factor—barring state law
application where it would serve to frustrate federal
objectives359—may counsel against incorporation of state
common law in a few cases. The courts must consider this
issue, just as Kimbell Foods instructs, on a case-by-case basis.360
But the vast majority of private-law actions on federal enclaves
trigger no federal interests—even when the litigants are federal
officials. If a married ranger at Yosemite National Park carried
on an affair with one of his colleagues, no federal interests would
be frustrated if a court borrowed modern California law denying
the ranger’s wife the right to bring an action for alienation of
affections.361 Similarly, allowing a private right of action for
wrongful termination for a whistleblower employed by private
enterprises, like Southern California Edison’s San Onofre
nuclear plant, would frustrate no “specific [federal] objectives”362
for a federal enclave like Camp Pendleton.363
3. Federal Courts Should Borrow as Federal Common
Law Subsequent State Statutory Enactments That
Could Have Been Enacted by the State Courts
While courts bear responsibility for the overwhelming
majority of private-law development,364 legislatures do
sometimes intervene to alter common-law rules.365 Nonetheless,
usually legislative tweaks to the private law could have been
made by the courts through the common-lawmaking process.
358

See Strass, supra note 29, at 758 (criticizing McGlinn doctrine’s application
of past state laws because “[t]he cost of legal research would make most suits
impractical, leaving . . . claims unenforceable due to financial necessity”).
359
Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728.
360
Id.
361
The federal government acquired exclusive legislative jurisdiction over
Yosemite from California in 1920. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518,
525-26 (1938). California eliminated the tort of alienation of affections in 1939. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 43.5 (A.V. Lake & Co. 1939).
362
Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728.
363
Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 425 (1970) (noting that the
“differences . . . between . . . residents who live on federal enclaves and those who [live
in the surrounding state] are far more theoretical than real”).
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For example, California legislatively abolished the tort of
alienation of affections.366 In other states, courts abolished the
cause of action by judicial decision.367 Some states adopted the
comparative-fault doctrine legislatively;368 in others, courts
adopted the rule.369 The implied warranty of habitability for
residential dwellings was likewise adopted by either the courts
or the legislature, alternately, in different jurisdictions.370
For this reason, I posit that federal courts are
empowered to adopt as enclave common law subsequent
legislative modifications of the private law made by a
surrounding state so long as the modification at issue is of a
type that could have been made by the state courts. If a
particular modification falls within the ambit of a court’s
ordinary common-lawmaking authority, why should the fact
that the surrounding state enacted the change legislatively
abrogate a federal court’s ability to adopt the change into the
federal common law governing the enclave?
Because the courts themselves created the entire body
of private law in the first instance, the law of contracts,
property, and torts falls within the courts’ common-lawmaking
jurisdiction.371 Conversely, aspects of modern regulatory
schemes that have no common-law antecedents, such as
366

CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.5.
E.g., Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Ky. 1992); O’Neil v. Schuckardt,
733 P.2d 693, 698 (Idaho 1986); Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 791 (Iowa
1981); Wyman v. Wallace, 615 P.2d 452, 453 (Wash. 1980).
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E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1763 to 1765 (Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1321-111 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp. 1979); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 663-31 (1976); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-801 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1976); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 156 (Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp.
1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1979); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 58-607-1 (Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. 25-1151 (1975 reissue); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7a (Supp. 1977).
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E.g., Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,
532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 439 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v.
Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 899 (Ill. 1981); Kirby v. Larson, 256 N.W.2d 400, 434 (Mich. 1977).
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minimum-wage statutes, fall outside the ambit of the courts’
common-lawmaking power.372
A federal court adjudicating an alienation-of-affections
suit by a resident of the Presidio of San Francisco should
pronounce the cause of action extinguished as a matter of
federal common law, even though California abolished the tort
legislatively. Similarly, a federal court considering the question
of innkeepers’ liability at issue in Fant should adopt, as federal
common law, Arkansas’s subsequent statutory repudiation of
the former strict-liability rule.373 The enactment and abolition of
such causes of action fall squarely within the ambit of the
courts’ common-lawmaking function. The “power” of the courts
“to alter or amend the common law” constitutes a
quintessential feature of Anglo-American jurisprudence.374
Indeed, even comprehensive legislative modifications to
the private law can be adopted as federal common law if state
courts could have made those changes. Contract law consists
mostly of a body of judge-made rules enacted over several
centuries.375 Legislative changes to the body of contract law by
definition could have been made by the courts in the first
instance.376 For this reason, federal courts deciding admiralty
cases, which are governed by federal common law, have
borrowed Article 2 of the UCC when adjudicating cases
involving transactions in goods.377 The courts are empowered to
do so because the UCC’s provisions could have been adopted by
the courts in their common-lawmaking capacity.378 Federal courts
adjudicating enclave-based contracts involving transactions in
goods should likewise borrow the provisions of the UCC
applicable in the surrounding state as federal common law.
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See infra Part VII.B.
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As the courts have noted in borrowing the UCC for
admiralty cases, incorporation of the code into contracts
governed by federal common law serves the “goals of uniformity
and predictability.”379 This is all the more true in the case of
enclave-based contracts because the transacting parties are
most often residents of the surrounding state.380
B.

Congress Should Enact a Federal Assimilative Labor Act

While incorporating state private law into federal
common law can remedy most of the private law anomalies
created by the McGlinn doctrine, some state legislation falls
outside the ambit of a court’s common-lawmaking authority.
For example, courts lack the authority to enact many aspects of
modern state labor codes, such as wage-and-hour provisions
and workplace-safety ordinances. Thus, such ordinances cannot
be incorporated as federal common law. To remedy inequities
resulting from the inapplicability of state labor statutes on
federal enclaves, I modestly propose that Congress enact a law
in the vein of the ACA, making contemporary state labor and
employment statutes applicable to nongovernment workers
employed on federal enclaves.
As the Sharpnack Court recognized, Congress can choose
to adopt existing and future state statutes into the body of law
applicable within enclaves.381 Using the Federal Reservations Act
(which makes state wrongful-death statutes applicable on
enclaves382) as a reference, Congress should enact the following:
Extension of State Labor and Employment Laws to buildings, works,
and property of the Federal Government.
(a) Subject to the limitation enumerated in subsection (b), civilians
employed by private enterprises within a national park or other
place subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,
within the exterior boundaries of any State, shall possess the same
rights and remedies accorded by the Labor and Employment Laws of
the State within whose exterior boundaries such place may be; and
in any action brought to recover on account of violation of such laws
the rights and remedies of the parties shall be governed by the laws
of the State within the exterior boundaries of which it may be.

379

Princess Cruises, Inc., 143 F.3d at 832.
See Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 425 (1970) (noting that the
“differences . . . between . . . residents who live on federal enclaves and those who [live
in the surrounding state] are far more theoretical than real”).
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(b) A State Labor and Employment Law otherwise applicable under
subsection (a) will be inapplicable within a national park or other
place subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States if
application of such law would unduly burden specific federal
objectives for the place.

Like the ACA, this proposed statute would constitute “a
deliberate continuing adoption by Congress for federal
enclaves” of labor and employment laws “as shall have been
already put in effect by the respective States for their own
government.”383 It thereby places nongovernment workers
employed on a federal enclave on par with their counterparts
employed outside the enclave. Subsection (b) provides a safe
harbor analogous to that offered by Kimbell Foods, enabling
courts to decline to apply a state labor law if doing so “would
frustrate specific [federal] objectives” for the enclave.384
In the overwhelming majority of cases, no federal
objective justifies immunizing private employers such as
George Lucas’s Industrial Light & Magic from state
employment laws. The immunity presently enjoyed by enclavebased enterprises exists only because of a historical accident.
Congress should remedy that mistake as it previously did,
making contemporary state criminal, wrongful-death and
workers’ compensation statutes applicable within enclaves.
CONCLUSION
To many, the term federal enclave conjures images of
distant military outposts on untamed frontiers. This is not an
accurate picture. Over the last century, many enclaves evolved
into bustling commercial centers,385 often lying within major
metropolitan areas.386 Federal enclaves encompass a whopping
659 million acres—almost 30 percent of the United States.387
Millions of civilians live in, work in, or pass through them
everyday388—most likely unaware of the potential legal
383
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consequences of doing so. Millions of dollars of commercial
transactions take place within enclaves every year.389
The McGlinn doctrine relegates these places to the
status of jurisprudential Jurassic Parks, reanimating extinct
legal precepts to wreak havoc on unwary citizens. Zombiedoctrines like caveat emptor and the tort of alienation of
affections lurk in the shadows, while modern innovations like
implied warranties and the UCC do not exist. Worse yet,
enclave status denies millions of state residents relief afforded
under progressive state labor statutes enacted in the latter half
of the twentieth century.
Much of the blame for this state of affairs lies with
Congress. The rule of international law upon which the
McGlinn doctrine rests presupposes that upon assuming
jurisdiction a new sovereign will establish new laws to govern the
territory. The assimilation of existing municipal laws is intended
only to serve as a stop-gap measure to prevent “a hiatus in the
legal system.”390 Such laws are not meant to live into perpetuity.
The new sovereign assumes an obligation to actually govern the
territory. Congress has failed to fulfill this duty.
Even greater fault rests with the federal courts.
Responsibility for the vast majority of private-law development
lies with the courts in their common-lawmaking function.391
Federal acquisition should not freeze enclave common law at
the moment of cession. As federal instrumentalities, federal
courts must assume the responsibility to promulgate federal
common law to govern enclave-based private-law disputes. The
courts have failed in this duty despite the fact that it imposes
only de minimis responsibilities. The Supreme Court’s decision
in Kimbell Foods empowers the lower federal courts to simply
borrow392 ready-made state common-law rules in cases where
“there is little need for a nationally uniform body of law.”393
Because the “differences . . . between . . . residents that live on
federal enclaves and those who [live in the surrounding state]
are far more theoretical than real,” in the overwhelming
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majority of cases no federal need exists for a uniform body of
enclave common law.394
Borrowing state common law rules as federal common
law would cure the bulk of the jurisprudential anomalies
afflicting enclaves. Nonetheless, many provisions of state labor
codes—particularly wage-and-hour and workplace-safety
regulations—lie beyond the ambit of the courts’ traditional
common-lawmaking authority. For this reason, I propose
Congress utilize the familiar mold of the ACA to enact a
statute making contemporary state labor and employment laws
applicable within federal enclaves.
More than 130 years after McGlinn’s cow stepped into
the path of a Midwest train, the nation’s federal enclaves
continue to wallow in a state of jurisprudential entropy. “The
common law grows like a tree.”395 Failure to mend its branches
undermines the very edifice of the Anglo-American legal
system. As Justice Cardozo recognized, “If judges have woefully
misinterpreted the mores of their day or if the mores of their
day are no longer those of ours, they ought not to tie, in
helpless submission, the hands of their successors.”396 For
almost 30 percent of America’s territory, they do.
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